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Chapter Two 
Remedies in Administrative Law: A Roadmap to a Parallel Legal Universe 
Cristie Ford 
Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia 
I. Introduction 
The Northern Gateway pipeline saga introduced in this book’s first chapter is a case 
study in how administrative law operates in Canada, and the crucially important subjects, 
on the border between law and policy, that get decided through administrative law means. 
The saga also helps shed light on the role of the courts, vis-à-vis the executive, and in 
particular on the kinds of remedies that courts are able to impose.  
Gitxaala Nation1 is generally considered at least a qualified victory for the several 
First Nations that brought the matter to the Federal Court of Appeal. Gitxaala Nation had 
alleged that the federal Crown had failed in its duty to consult and, if necessary, to 
accommodate their interests during the Northern Gateway pipeline approval process. A 
majority of the Federal Court of Appeal held that they were right: that at key points, 
Canada had offered “only a brief, hurried, and inadequate opportunity … to exchange and 
discuss information and dialogue,” and that the consultation process fell “well short of 
the mark.”2 
In many respects, the majority’s decision looks like any appellate decision (albeit a 
long one, weighing in at almost 140 pages). It reviews the facts and the decisions reached 
below, analyzes the case law, and develops a lengthy set of reasons for deciding in the 
way it did. Yet in other ways, it looks different. For example, Gitxaala Nation are styled 
as both “appellants”—appealing a National Energy Board decision to issue regulatory 
certificates approving key pieces of the pipeline project—and as “applicants” on “judicial 
review,” challenging an Order in Council made by the Governor in Council (i.e., federal 
Cabinet, or the “GIC”), directing the NEB to issue those certificates. Is there a 
meaningful difference between an “applicant” and an “appellant”? How exactly does a 
court acquire the authority to oversee the actions of the National Energy Board, or of 
federal Cabinet? The Federal Court of Appeal also made observations about its role that 
were very different from what any appellate court would normally have made in 
reviewing a trial court decision. It said things like, “the Governor in Council is entitled to 
a very broad margin of appreciation in making its discretionary decision upon the widest 
considerations of policy and public interest.”3 
1 2016 FCA 187, [2016] FCJ No 705 (QL). 
2 Ibid at para 325. 
3 Ibid at para 152. 
Perhaps more importantly, although the Gitxaala were seen to have enjoyed a victory, 
the remedy they received was confusing. The court did not make a decision about 
whether, on its merits, the Northern Gateway pipeline project should proceed. It did not 
give it the go-ahead, nor order that it had to be stopped. It did not order sanctions or 
money damages against the GIC for proceeding with the project on the basis of what it 
had held to be inadequate consultation. Instead, it “quashed” the earlier GIC decision and 
sent it back, again to the GIC, for reconsideration. The majority held that Canada would 
have to go back and adequately consult with the relevant First Nations, but once it had 
done so (something the court did not think would take long) it was apparently free to 
continue with the approval process.  
None of this seems very familiar or necessarily, at first glance, very satisfactory. 
What was going on? Why did this outcome count as a success for the Gitxaala Nation at 
all, if it failed to stop the pipeline, imposed no damages, and put the ultimate approval 
decision back with the GIC itself? Was this the most they could have hoped for? 
Understanding how the remedies operated in this case involves understanding how 
administrative law remedies have evolved to be something separate from what we 
normally expect from courts—something that recognizes the particular role of 
administrative decision-makers, like the GIC and many others, and that draws on a 
particular tradition, and a particular understanding of court authority.  
Even starting with a court decision as we have done, however, can obscure what goes 
on before a party like the Gitxaala get to court. Administrative law does not begin at the 
point where a party to an administrative action seeks judicial review of that action 
through the courts. The scope of administrative law begins much earlier, and also 
encompasses administrative decision-making processes that may take policy into account, 
or operate under a different mandate, or that otherwise look quite different from what a 
court is likely to produce. Most other tribunals, to be sure, are not as purely political as 
the GIC, but nor are they courts.4 Rich forms of action are possible in these forums. A 
tight focus on court action thus misses the hugely important first step in real-life 
administrative action: the varied and sometimes creative remedies that a tribunal itself 
may impose. 
Let us, then, start at the beginning. This chapter provides an overview of 
administrative law remedies as a whole, including not only judicial review but also front-
line tribunal remedies, internal and external appeals, enforcement mechanisms, and 
                                               
4 The GIC is not a tribunal at all, but it is the exception in this chapter. For simplicity I 
use the term "tribunal" throughout to refer to the full range of administrative agencies, 
commissions, and other bodies, but generally not including Cabinet. This is an 
oversimplification, because many administrative decision-makers do not take a tribunal 
form. Many administrative decisions are made by bureaucrats without a hearing or the 
court-style structure of a tribunal; administrative agencies also regularly make policy 
decisions that affect individual and social interests. However, the tribunal is perhaps the 
prototypical administrative structure for the purpose of understanding the remedies 
available to a party to tribunal action. 
extralegal strategies. Discussing remedies near the beginning of an administrative law 
textbook may seem unconventional. We have chosen this approach because 
understanding the available remedies is an important part of understanding what one is 
getting into in administrative law, and it provides a broad structural framework on which 
subsequent chapters can build. This chapter is meant to operate almost as a decision tree, 
to help guide students through the different stages where remedies issues arise. Figure 3.1 
sets out the broad outlines of the chapter. 
Figure 3.1 
 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section II, "Remedial Options at 
the Tribunal Stage," Section III, "Enforcing Tribunal Orders Against Parties," and even 
the first part of Section IV, "Challenging Administrative Action" have not traditionally 
been located in the "remedies" chapter of administrative law texts (if they appear at all). 
As we shall see in Section II, remedial options available to administrative agencies at the 
first stage differ from those available to courts and reflect the different composition of 
tribunals. The remedies available at the administrative stage are both more limited (in 
terms of the tribunal's statute-derived authority to impose them) and, potentially, more 
expansive (as a consequence of tribunals' particular expertise and their ability to remain 
seized of a matter over time). Section III looks at the ability of a party or tribunal to 
enforce a tribunal order against another party, either civilly or criminally. Section IV 
considers parties' ability to challenge tribunal action. This includes internal appeal 
options, extralegal options, appeal to the courts, and, finally, the classic administrative 
law remedy of judicial review (which, as discussed below, is not the same thing as appeal 
to the courts). In addressing these three aspects in a single chapter, the goal is to provide 
the reader, in a systematic and chronological fashion, with a conceptual frame of 
reference that includes the full range of remedial options available to parties before 
administrative tribunals. 
II. Remedial Options at the Tribunal Stage 
Administrative tribunals are as varied as the topics on which they adjudicate, and it 
would be unwise to generalize about the remedial powers available to them. However, 
two general comments about available remedies can safely be made. First, because a 
tribunal does not have the general jurisdiction that a court does, the power to impose a 
particular remedy must be provided for in the tribunal's enabling statute. Whether a 
tribunal can order that, for example, money damages be paid, an administrative penalty 
be imposed, or an individual be stripped of a licence will depend on the remedial powers 
the statute provides to it. Second, most tribunals' composition, structure, and mandates 
are different from courts', and their approach to remedies reflects those differences. For 
example, certain tribunals' expertise with a more limited subject matter may help them to 
identify systemic problems or recurring patterns across multiple individual disputes. 
Their ability to stay involved in (that is, to remain "seized" or to “have seizin” of) a 
dispute over a longer period of time is well established, and many tribunals are less 
constrained by formal rules than courts are in developing remedies. Together, on 
occasion, these factors allow tribunals to conceptualize and implement novel remedial 
strategies aimed at addressing the systemic problems they see.  
A. Statutory Authority 
As a creature of statute, a tribunal cannot make orders that affect individuals' rights or 
obligations without authority from its enabling statute.5 Therefore, the first step in 
determining a tribunal's remedial options is to look at the statute itself. If a tribunal makes 
orders outside the scope of its enabling statute, it is exceeding its jurisdiction, and those 
orders will be void.6 
Many enabling statutes set out express lists of the remedies a tribunal may order. For 
example, tribunals often have the power to make declaratory orders, to order a party to 
repair a problem or to mitigate damage, or to order a party to comply with the tribunal's 
enabling statute. Licensing powers may also be given to tribunals in statutory regimes 
designed to protect the public (for example, through professional licensing qualifications 
or requirements for corporations issuing securities to public investors), or to manage 
                                               
5 Att Gen of Can v Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 SCR 735, [1980] SCJ No 99 (QL). 
6 When two tribunals share jurisdiction over a particular statutory provision (e.g., a 
workers' compensation tribunal and a human rights tribunal considering a statutory 
provision that concerns them both), a tribunal can also be found to exceed its jurisdiction 
if it deals with a claim that has already been "appropriately dealt with" by the other 
relevant tribunal. See British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011 
SCC 52, [2011] 3 SCR 422. 
 
natural resources (for example, fishing and forestry licences). Some tribunals can appoint 
conciliators and otherwise assist in settling matters before them.7 Some enabling statutes 
empower tribunals to impose significant fines and possible incarceration, or provide for 
more serious quasi-criminal offences that must be prosecuted by the Crown.8 
Other statutes accord their tribunals broad, discretionary power to fashion the 
remedies they see fit. For example, the Ontario Human Rights Code gives the Ontario 
Human Rights Tribunal the discretion to order a party who has been found to 
discriminate to "do anything that, in the opinion of the tribunal, the party ought to do to 
achieve compliance with this Act, both in respect of the complaint and in respect of 
future practices."9 
Even where a tribunal's remedial power is less certain (that is, its enabling statute 
does not expressly permit a particular remedy and the tribunal has no broad discretionary 
power), one may try to argue that, as a matter of practical necessity, a tribunal must have 
the remedial power to do the things its statute requires it to do.10 However, orders for the 
payment of money, such as compensation or damages, fines, fees and levies, and costs, 
can generally only be ordered by tribunals that have the express statutory authority to do 
so. Tribunals also lack the equitable jurisdiction to order interim injunctions, although 
they may be given statutory authority to seek an injunction in court to enforce a statute. 
Finally, whether a tribunal has the power to grant remedies under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms11 is a separate question. As Evan Fox-Decent and Alexander 
Pless explain in Chapter 13,, a separate test determines whether particular administrative 
tribunals can grant remedies under s 24(1) of the Charter.12 Moreover, some provinces 
have now enacted statutes that explicitly bar at least some tribunals from considering 
Charter issues.13 
                                               
7 E.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, ss 47-48; BC Employment 
Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 78. 
8 See e.g. BC Securities Act, RSCBC 1996, c 418, s 155. 
9 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 41(1)(a). 
10 ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 
1 SCR 140. 
11 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, RSC 1985, app II, no 44. 
12 See R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765. 
13 See e.g. the BC Administrative Tribunals Act, 36 SBC 2004, c 45 [ATA], which 
provides that the majority of provincial tribunals do not have discretion to consider either 
constitutional questions generally, or at least constitutional questions relating to the 
Charter. The statute establishes a mechanism for referring constitutional questions to the 
courts. Sections 46.1-46.3 of the Act impose similar restrictions on many tribunals' 
 
B. What Makes Administrative Tribunals Unique 
Administrative tribunals and agencies vary widely in their structures and functions, 
but collectively they also differ from courts in important ways. The particular structures 
and qualities of administrative tribunals equally affect the kinds of remedies they are 
inclined, and empowered, to grant. This part of the chapter seeks to set out in broad 
strokes the kinds of remedies that tribunal-type administrative bodies in particular are 
likely to grant. The kinds of functions performed by tribunal-type administrative 
bodies—namely, party-on-party dispute resolution, party-versus-agency enforcement and 
disciplinary proceedings, and other similar forms of hearings and decision-making—tend 
to be the most common ways in which members of the public engage with administrative 
bodies. These functions also square especially well with the concept of a "remedy," 
defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "the means by which the violation of a right is 
prevented, redressed, or compensated."14 
However, the reader should be aware that tribunal-type administrative agencies are 
only one version of administrative agency operations. Parties may interact, be answerable 
to, and seek to influence administrative law agencies in other ways. Agencies' policy-
making functions, in particular, are outside the scope of this chapter but should not be 
outside one's field of vision.15 Through their statutory drafting choices, legislators 
regularly delegate detailed policy-making decisions to administrative tribunals. Many 
larger administrative agencies have formal policy-making departments, which generally 
operate at some remove from their tribunal departments. Administrative policy 
instruments can range from formal, binding interpretive releases to relatively informal, 
non-binding administrative guidance. Policy releases and guidelines have a direct impact 
on regulated entities. They are publicly available, and regulated entities are expected to 
know about them. Their release can be preceded by formal public consultation, providing 
those affected with a chance for input in advance. 
Moreover, even when acting in their tribunal capacity, administrative tribunals often 
do, and should, take a broader perspective on a dispute than courts necessarily will. One 
way to understand the difference is in terms described by an American scholar, Abram 
Chayes, in the mid-1970s.16 Chayes talked about courts, not administrative agencies. 
Nevertheless, his point illuminates the distinction between the two. Chayes described an 
                                               
jurisdiction to apply the BC Human Rights Code to any matter before them on the basis 
that the Human Rights Tribunal is the more appropriate forum. 
14 Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed., sub verbo "remedy." 
15 See Chapter 8, Delegation and Consultation: How the Administrative State Functions. 
16 Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv L 
Rev 1281; see also DM Gordon, "'Administrative' Tribunals and the Courts" (1933) 49 
LQ Rev 94 (defining a judicial function as one that determines "pre-existing" rights and 
liabilities by reference to a "fixed objective standard," as contrasted to an administrative 
function, in which rights and liabilities are created by "policy and expediency"). 
emerging dichotomy between traditional conceptions of adjudication and an emerging 
judicial role in what he described as public law litigation. In traditional adjudication, a 
suit involves only the private parties before the court. It is self-contained and party-
initiated. A dispassionate judge identifies the private right at issue on the basis of 
doctrinal analysis and retrospective fact inquiry. The judge imposes relief, understood as 
compensation for the past violation of an identifiable existing right. (This portrayal 
describes party-on-party dispute resolution, but this sort of rights-based approach also 
underpins tribunal-on-party regulatory action, such as a self-regulatory profession’s 
disciplinary proceeding against one of its members.) By contrast, in public law litigation, 
Chayes argued that the debate is more focused on the vindication of broader statutory or 
constitutional policies. The lawsuit is not self-contained. The judge must manage 
complex trial situations involving not only the parties to the dispute but also the many 
and shifting parties not before the court who nevertheless may be affected by the suit's 
outcome. Fact inquiry is predictive, not retrospective. Through a combination of party 
negotiation and continuing judicial involvement, the judge fashions relief that is ad hoc, 
ongoing, and prospective. On the Chayes model, judges can become change agents under 
whose management specific cases can have far-reaching effects. 
Like Chayes's public law adjudicatory model, administrative agencies—even when 
acting as tribunals rather than policy-making bodies—may have a broader mandate, and 
the ability to leverage a broader range of tools than a traditional assertion of rights-based 
claims provides. Chayes’s point was somewhat aspirational when it came to courts, but it 
is accurate in describing how at least some tribunals function. Many administrative 
bodies are explicitly charged with managing complex and often "polycentric" problems in 
a comprehensive manner. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized this, pointing out 
that "while judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar opposition of parties, interests, and 
factual discovery, some problems [assigned to tribunals by their enabling statutes] require 
the consideration of numerous interests simultaneously, and the promulgation of 
solutions which concurrently balance benefits and costs for many different parties."17  
This has a few implications. First, it means that relative to courts, administrative 
tribunals have stronger theoretical justifications for remaining seized of a case over a 
longer period of time.18 Second, it means that administrative tribunals may try to develop 
remedies that address underlying structural or systemic problems, in a forward-looking 
                                               
17 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 
at para 36, [1998] SCJ No 46 (QL); see also Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan 
(District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 SCR 5 at paras 17-25; Canada v Kabul Farms Inc, 2016 
FCA 143, [2016] FCJ No 480 (QL) at paras 24-25. 
18 See e.g. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services) v Ontario (Human Rights Comm) 
(2001), 39 CHRR 308 (Ont Sup Ct), aff'd [2004] OJ 5051 (CA) (holding that the Human 
Rights Tribunal of Ontario had extensive supervisory jurisdiction over its orders and 
could remain seized of a matter to recast its orders to deal with ongoing systemic racism 
at correctional facilities). 
 
rather than retrospective, rights-oriented way. This is not to say that courts may not also 
sometimes craft systemic, forward-looking remedies. Indeed, Chayes's point is that they 
may.19 However, relative to courts, administrative tribunals may be especially well placed 
to develop and implement novel remedies thanks to their subject-specific expertise, their 
field sensitivity, and their particular statutory mandates. 
Just as important, administrative tribunal members are a more diverse group than 
judges are, especially in terms of their training and expertise. Many tribunal members are 
not legally trained. Some tribunals' enabling statutes stipulate that a certain portion of 
their tribunal members should be laypersons. For example, the federal Competition 
Tribunal Act20 stipulates that the tribunal shall consist of not more than six members who 
are Federal Court judges, and not more than eight other "lay" members. The statute goes 
on to say that the Governor in Council should establish an advisory council, "to be 
composed of not more than ten members who are knowledgeable in economics, industry, 
commerce or public affairs,"21 to advise the Minister of Industry with respect to the 
appointment of lay members. The result is a tribunal with substantial expertise in 
economics and in commerce.22 The tribunal's expertise also makes it more likely that its 
members will devise remedies that reflect their training and perspective, and that may be 
more economic than legal. 
Sometimes, the composition of tribunal membership reflects an explicit attempt to 
represent different interest groups, perhaps especially in subject areas where there is a 
perception that judges historically have been unsympathetic or not alive to some of the 
issues at stake. A classic example is a tripartite labour board, on which a representative of 
labour, a representative of management, and a third member must sit. A further example 
of a tripartite structure is the BC Review Board, charged under the Criminal Code23 of 
Canada with making dispositions with respect to individuals found unfit to stand trial or 
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. The BC Mental Health Act24 
requires that each panel of the Review Board consist of a doctor, a lawyer, and a person 
                                               
19 Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 
3, provides justification for structural injunction-style remedies by courts. 
20 RSCR 1985, c 19 (2d Supp) s 3(2). 
21 Ibid, s 3(3). 
22 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748. 
Separately, note that expertise is not only based on qualifications. Tribunal members also 
gain expertise through familiarity and experience with their fields. 
23 RSC, 1985, c C-46. 
24 RSBC 1996, c 288 
 
who is neither a doctor nor a lawyer.25 The kinds of remedies that such boards devise are 
likely to reflect the particular priorities and assumptions of its members, and may not be 
limited to the set of strictly legal remedies that spring most easily to the legally trained 
mind. 
Administrative law has also been affected by what is variously called "new public 
management" theory, neoliberalism, or administrative structures that "span the public–
private divide." Effectively, these are mechanisms by which public structures, such as 
administrative tribunals, retain ultimate accountability for their programs but "outsource" 
the implementation of those programs to private or third-party actors. For example, 
hundreds of standards developed by private bodies are incorporated into law and used for 
enforcement and compliance purposes.26 Regulators also delegate enforcement and 
compliance functions to private bodies. For example, the Technical Standards and Safety 
Association (TSSA) is a delegated administrative authority for Ontario safety regulation 
covering elevating devices, amusement rides, boilers, and other products. The various 
provincial securities commissions also delegate the regulation of investment dealers and 
mutual fund dealers to their respective self-regulated organizations, the Investment 
Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) and the Mutual Fund Dealers 
Association (MFDA). Many professionals, including doctors and lawyers, are regulated 
in Canada by their self-governing professional bodies, which are not government 
agencies. 
These are deeply embedded features of Canadian law, especially in fields where there 
are highly technical product or process issues to be regulated. They are also controversial, 
particularly as their use becomes more widespread and it becomes clear that "technical" 
standards are not so easily divorced from larger social and policy considerations. 
Proponents of public–private coordination in regulation argue that delegated 
implementation is the best way forward for administrative agencies that are otherwise at 
risk of being ineffective and out of touch; that it allocates action to those bodies best 
equipped and with the greatest information to perform tasks effectively; that public–
private partnerships are capable of accomplishing public ends more efficiently than the 
public sector could acting alone; and that such partnerships do not eliminate the public 
                                               
25 RSBC 1996, c 288, s 24.1(3). Additional guidelines on qualifications for part-time 
members of the board can be found in "Recruitment, Screening and Appointment 
Procedures" (Vancouver: British Columbia Review Board, 2004), online: British 
Columbia Review Board 
[lt]http://www.bcrb.bc.ca/BCRB%20Recruitment%20Procedures%202011.pdf[gt]. 
26 For example, since 1927, the Canadian Standards Association's Canadian Electrical 
Code, Canadian Standards Association Standard C22.1-06, has provided the standards for 
addressing shock and fire hazards of electrical products in Canada. It has been 
incorporated by reference into provincial regulations across the country: see e.g. 
Electrical Safety Regulation, BC Reg 100/2004, s 20. 
 
state, but rather "save" it from its own bureaucratic flaws.27 Those opposed argue that 
these mechanisms are privatization by another name; that they reduce accountability and 
the public sector's responsibility for what should be publicly provided goods and 
services; and that they "hollow out" the state in potentially irretrievable ways.28 We must 
leave this important debate for another day. At a practical level, though, parties to 
administrative actions should be aware that a constellation of ostensibly private actors 
may play more or less formal roles in real-life public administration. 
As well, both tribunal-side and policy-side administrative functions have been 
affected by globalization. The effects of globalization mean that domestic administrative 
tribunals no longer act entirely free of international and transnational agreements, 
organizations, standard-setting bodies, and commitments. Some of the most notable 
international examples come out of the European Union, whose policy and harmonization 
directives and court decisions have, over the last several decades, had a direct impact on 
European nation states' domestic administrative law. In Canada, as well, international 
obligations have had an impact on, for example, federal labour policies and their 
subsequent administration through a variety of public bodies.29 International human 
rights norms have also influenced the substantive review of administrative decisions.30 
Relevant international or transnational standards are sometimes set by governments 
acting together (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and its 
associated side agreements) and sometimes by independent, private, or non-governmental 
bodies filling lacunae in international law (as is the case with forest practices 
                                               
27 Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law" 
(2000) 52 Admin L Rev 813; Richard Stewart, "Administrative Law in the Twenty-First 
Century" (2003) 78 NYUL Rev 437. 
28 See e.g. Harry Arthurs, "Public Law in a Neoliberal Globalized World: The 
Administrative State Goes to Market (and Cries 'Wee, Wee, Wee' All the Way Home)" 
(2005) 55 UTLJ 797. 
29 Canada, Commission on Labour Standards Review, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour 
Standards for the 21st Century (Gatineau: Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada, 2006) at 51-52, online: 
[lt]http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment_standards/fls/pdf/final_report.pdf[gt]. 
30 See Chapter 14, The Role of International Human Rights Norms in Administrative 
Law. 
 
certification).31 Looking at these developments, some scholars have even begun to herald 
the birth of a "global administrative law."32 
Thus, the conversation about proper tribunal action spans multiple disciplines—law, 
public policy, and organizational and political theory—and it is taking place at the levels 
of practice and theory, both within tribunals and with respect to them. The forces that 
influence tribunals produce remedies that can be more dynamic and varied than the ones 
we are accustomed to seeing in the courts. Courts’ review of administrative action—the 
piece of the puzzle that gets so much attention in mainstream Canadian administrative 
law courses—is only one facet of administrative law. 
C. Systemic Remedies at the Tribunal Level  
Some of the factors described above—ongoing seizin, a broad mandate, different 
expertise, public–private coordination, and transnational linkages—have led some 
tribunals to create innovative remedies. For example, one cluster of innovations 
incorporates an independent third party in trying to develop and implement remedial 
measures within a subject organization or corporation where systemic problems seem to 
be significant. These remedies try to effectuate meaningful systemic change within the 
organization through sustained engagement with the problem by an impartial outsider. 
They have become fairly common among securities and other corporate regulators in 
particular, in the United States and Australia, as well as Canada.33 An important function 
                                               
31 Errol Meidinger, "The Administrative Law of Global Private–Public Regulation: The 
Case of Forestry" (2006) 17 EJIL 47. 
32 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, "The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law" (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 15. 
33 In the United States, corporate monitorships have been imposed on dozens of 
corporations under the terms of deferred criminal prosecution agreements or regulatory 
enforcement settlements. On the effectiveness of corporate monitorships in that context, 
see Cristie Ford & David Hess, "Corporate Monitorships and New Governance 
Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context" (2011) 33:4 Law & Pol'y 509. The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was a pioneer in developing what are 
known there as "enforceable undertakings": Christine Parker, "Restorative Justice in 
Business Regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Use of 
Enforceable Undertakings" (2004) 67 Mod L Rev 209. Canadian examples include 
Settlement Agreement, Mackie Research Capital Corporation, 2010 BCSECCOM 646 
(22 November 2010), online: 
[lt]http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/comdoc.nsf/0/599572db2a73de48882577ed00618775/$FILE/2
010%20BCSECCOM%20646.pdf[gt]; Settlement Agreement, In the Matter of Union 
Securities Ltd and John P Thompson (18 April 2006), online: 
[lt]http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=71522FD9816A452F8246B
58D8776B613&Language=fr[gt]; Order, In the Matter of Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited 
 
of the third party in this context is to facilitate a deliberative process within the 
organization itself—that is, to help the troubled organization confront and work through 
its problems internally. Some scholars argue that transparent, accountable, and broadly 
participatory dialogue of this nature, potentially facilitated by such third parties, is the 
most legitimate and most effective mechanism for making decisions in complex 
organizational structures.34 
One effort at creating such a deliberative, third-party facilitated process took place 
within Ontario's Ministry of Correctional Services, as a response to a long-standing 
human rights complaint by an employee of the Ministry. The complainant in that case, 
Michael McKinnon, was a correctional officer of Indigenous ancestry working within the 
Ministry of Correctional Services. In 1998, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (then 
called the Board of Inquiry) found that Mr. McKinnon suffered discrimination and 
harassment at his workplace, the Toronto East Detention Centre, because of his race, 
ancestry, and ethnic origin. In response, the tribunal ordered a number of systemic 
remedies to address the "poisoned atmosphere" at the facility, Toronto East, and within 
Corrections generally. Among other things, the tribunal ordered that certain individual 
respondents be relocated, that the tribunal's order be publicized among Corrections 
employees, and that a human rights training program be established. The tribunal 
reconvened the hearing in 2002 because of Mr. McKinnon's allegations that the poisoned 
work environment had not improved. The issue for the tribunal at that point was not 
whether the existing systemic remedies had been implemented in a strict sense, but 
whether they had been carried out in good faith. 
After dealing with the question whether it could remain seized of the matter—finding 
that it could, as affirmed later by the Ontario Court of Appeal35—the tribunal ordered an 
additional range of remedies, including training for Ministry and Facility management; 
establishing a roster of external mediators to deal with discrimination complaints; and 
appointing, at the Ministry's expense, an independent third-party consultant nominated by 
the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) to develop and oversee the delivery of 
training programs. The third-party consultant was to be nominated by the OHRC, to be 
paid for by the Ministry, and to report to the tribunal.  
What makes these remedies interesting is that they are so different in character from 
traditional legal remedies, such as damages (in the civil context) or quashing of Ministry 
or Facility decisions (in the administrative law context). This looks like Chayes's public 
law litigation model: these remedies are prospective, open-ended, and subject to ongoing 
                                               
(28 April 2005), online: Ontario Securities Commission 
[lt]http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/10499.htm[gt]. 
34 See e.g. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); but see César A Rodríguez-Garavito, 
"Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles 
in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico and Guatemala" (2005) Politics & Society 203. 
35 Ontario v McKinnon, [2004] OJ No 5051 (QL).  
revision and elaboration. The tribunal's remedial orders—the emphasis on training, and 
bringing in the expertise of external human rights consultants to work with the Ministry 
in developing that training—seem geared less toward redressing the wrongs against Mr. 
McKinnon in particular, and more toward effecting wide-ranging, permanent, systemic 
change to institutional culture. 
The McKinnon case became the longest-running human rights case in Canada but 
ultimately, after a protracted and difficult run, it had a somewhat happy ending. As of 
May 2005, the parties were still arguing over the scope of the third-party consultant's 
responsibilities, with the consultant alleging that the Ministry was attempting to gain 
control over the process. The process of defining the consultant's mandate seemed itself 
to have become an adversarial contest that did not bode well for the consultant's ability to 
catalyze the hoped-for meaningful dialogue within the Ministry.36 By 2007, the tribunal 
found that the Ministry had not been implementing the tribunal's previous orders in good 
faith,37 and in February 2011 the tribunal found that a prima facie case had been made 
out that the Deputy Minister was in contempt for failing to implement the earlier orders. 
The tribunal exercised its discretion to state a case for contempt to the Ontario Divisional 
Court.38 (As we see below, this is a tribunal’s last resort in trying to get its orders 
followed.) 
Before that case could be heard, however, and after 23 years of litigation, Michael 
McKinnon and the Ministry finally reached a settlement. Under the August 2011 
settlement agreement, the OHRC, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional 
Services, and the Ministry of Government Services all signed on to a three-year Human 
Rights Project, which established mechanisms targeting accountability, operations, 
learning, and complaint management within Correctional Services.39 Despite progress, 
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however, a pervasive “organizational culture” remained a barrier to effecting “long-term, 
systemic, or broad-based human rights improvements.”40 In the agreement’s final year, 
the parties formulated a “Multi-Year Plan” to “crystalize the extensive work” done to 
date and to “sustain change” into the future.41 
The McKinnon settlement and the efforts that continue to follow it are cause for some 
optimism, but a satisfactory result was never, and is still not, a foregone conclusion. The 
2011 settlement might not have happened in the absence of a factor external to the 
tribunal process—the appointment of a new Deputy Minister of Corrections with a 
mandate to professionalize the service and improve its record.42 Nor is a 23-year-long 
litigation matter ever really a victory, no matter what its outcome. Thus, McKinnon raised 
and still leaves us with some challenging questions: is it possible to effect real, 
substantive "good faith" compliance in a truly recalcitrant employer? Is it appropriate to 
use law to simultaneously enforce rights, redress wrongs, and "cure" systemic problems? 
Is it appropriate for a tribunal to continue crafting new orders in an effort to achieve an 
optimal outcome? Can external third parties really change culture and create meaningful 
dialogue? If not, what legal options do we have left—through tribunal remedies or 
otherwise? 
Moreover, we should not overestimate courts’ comfort with broader remedial orders 
by tribunals that aim to address systemic problems. Court review of tribunal remedies by 
means of judicial review serves a valuable validation function, based on important rule-
of-law values. It also introduces some difficult tensions. As we have identified, cases like 
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McKinnon straddle what Chayes might describe as the boundary between party-on-party 
dispute resolution and public law litigation. As we know, when courts engage with 
systemic issues they run quickly into public policy choices, public law separation of 
powers concerns, and legitimacy concerns. Tribunals, too, may quickly run into the limits 
of their statutory authority. This is as it should be. And yet, for these reasons, judicial 
review may always serve as a brake on tribunals’ more ambitious efforts to effect 
systemic change. 
For example, in Moore v British Columbia (Education),43 the court reviewed the BC 
Human Rights Tribunal’s decision that the failure to provide educational support to 
Jeffrey Moore, a child with dyslexia, constituted discrimination on the basis of disability. 
The tribunal had considered not only Jeffrey’s personal damages but also the fact that the 
BC Ministry of Education had implemented a fixed cap on special education funding, 
below the actual incidence rate; and the school district’s decision, faced with those 
funding constraints, to close its Diagnostic Centre, which provided support to dyslexic 
students, without providing an adequate substitute.  
At the Supreme Court of Canada, writing for a unanimous court, Abella J upheld the 
Human Rights Tribunal’s findings of discrimination against Jeffrey by the District, and 
the personal damages it awarded. However, the tribunal’s systemic remedies were held to 
be too remote from the scope of the complaint.44 They were “quashed,” or invalidated. 
The court observed that a remedy afforded by the tribunal to an individual claimant could 
still have a systemic impact, but that 
The remedy must flow from the claim. In this case, the claim was made 
on behalf of Jeffrey, and the evidence giving concrete support to the claim all 
centred on him. While the Tribunal was certainly entitled to consider systemic 
evidence in order to determine whether Jeffrey had suffered discrimination, it was 
unnecessary for it to hold an extensive inquiry into the precise format of the 
provincial funding mechanism or the entire provincial administration of special 
education in order to determine whether Jeffrey was discriminated against. The 
Tribunal, with great respect, is an adjudicator of the particular claim that is 
before it, not a Royal Commission.45 
 Abella J also set aside the tribunal’s remedial orders against the Ministry on the 
basis that the connection between province-wide fixed cap funding and closure of the 
Diagnostic Centre was too remote. Moreover, Abella J found no need for the tribunal to 
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remain seized “on behalf of an individual student who has finished his high school 
education and will not re-enter the public school system.”46 The sharp contrast in Moore 
between the tribunal’s conception of its mandate, consistent with the Chayes public law 
litigation model, and the Supreme Court’s retrospective, party-focused analysis 
underscores both the possibilities, and limitations, of novel remedial strategies in 
effecting systemic change. 
III. Enforcing Tribunal Orders Against Parties 
After a tribunal makes a decision and imposes an order, assuming no one challenges 
that decision,47 another set of administrative law remedies becomes available: the 
enforcement powers. These may be invoked where a tribunal needs to enforce its order 
against a party that is not complying with the order. This is not uncommon among self-
regulatory organizations such as professional licensing bodies, where the tribunal acts 
against particular individuals rather than adjudicating disputes between parties. 
Alternatively, a party to a multiparty dispute before a tribunal may want to enforce the 
tribunal's order against another party on which the order was imposed. Criminal 
prosecution is also a possibility. Of course, regardless of any broader social patterns or 
systemic factors operating, tribunal orders can only be enforced against the parties on 
which they are imposed. 
A. The Tribunal Seeks to Enforce Its Order 
Rarely, a tribunal may enforce its own orders. One tribunal that has the power to 
enforce its own orders—for example, an order for civil contempt—is the federal 
Competition Tribunal.48 Some other tribunals are also given the authority to enforce 
monetary obligations, such as requiring unpaid wages or family maintenance to be paid, 
imposing liens, making garnishment orders, seizing assets, or even suspending driving 
privileges.49 However, any enforcement powers a tribunal has must be granted to the 
tribunal in its enabling statute, and that delegation of enforcement power must pass 
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constitutional scrutiny. For example, a provincially created tribunal cannot have criminal 
(and therefore federal) enforcement powers.50 
In British Columbia, certain sections of the ATA51 are intended to assist tribunals in 
obtaining compliance with their orders. For example, s 18 permits certain tribunals to 
schedule a hearing, make a decision, or dismiss an application if a party fails to comply 
with an order (presumably, an order to appear). Section 31(1)(e) permits some tribunals 
to dismiss an application if the applicant fails to comply with a tribunal order. Section 47, 
which permits some tribunals to make orders for payment of costs, also allows some 
tribunals, under s 47(1)(c), to require a party to pay the tribunal's actual costs "if the 
tribunal considers the conduct of a party has been improper, vexatious, frivolous or 
abusive." Orders for costs, on being filed in the court registry, have the same effect as a 
court order for the recovery of a debt (s 47(2)). 
More commonly, the tribunal must make an application in court to enforce any order 
it makes. Where a party has disobeyed a tribunal order, the statute provides that the 
tribunal may apply to court for an order requiring the person to comply.52 The tribunal's 
order is presumed to be valid and correct if the party disobeying it failed to file an appeal 
(if one is available) or if the party appealed and lost.53 Other statutes allow tribunal orders 
to be registered with the court, sometimes only with leave.54 In Quebec, a distinct 
procedure known as homologation gives courts the authority to compel individuals to 
fulfill tribunal orders. Courts can only access homologation if it is expressly provided for 
in the tribunal's enabling statute.55 The omnibus Statutory Powers Procedure Act56 in 
Ontario allows tribunals to state a case for contempt to the Ontario Divisional Court, as 
happened in the McKinnon case in 2011. 
Once a tribunal has successfully converted its order into a court order through one of 
the mechanisms above, the order can be enforced in the same manner as a court 
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judgment. Among other things, this means that the court can initiate contempt 
proceedings if the party continues to disregard the order.57 Contempt proceedings may be 
available if a party fails to abide by a tribunal's procedural order (for example, by failing 
to appear as a witness or to produce documents) or a tribunal's final substantive order.58 
Contempt can be civil or, where the conduct constitutes an intentional public act of 
defiance of the court, criminal.59 In a contempt proceeding, the judge does not inquire 
into the validity of the tribunal's underlying order. However, only violations of "clear and 
unambiguous" tribunal orders will form the basis of a contempt order.60 A court can also 
refuse to hold a party in contempt until an appeal or judicial review application 
(discussed in Section IV below) is completed, although parties can be required to pay 
moneys into court in the meantime.61 
Note that legislators seem content to house tribunal order enforcement powers in the 
courts, even while using clauses to try to limit the availability of judicial review from 
administrative tribunals (known as “privative clauses”).62 For the legislative drafter, then, 
access to courts to enforce tribunal orders seems to be acceptable, while access to courts 
to challenge tribunal orders is less so. There is history at work here, along with separation 
of powers concerns and the legislator's appreciation for courts' existing enforcement 
powers. Arguably, this drafting choice also signals that legislators may be most 
concerned about conserving scarce judicial resources when those judicial resources might 
be deployed to undermine, rather than buttress and reinforce, the authority of the 
tribunals the legislation creates. 
B. A Party Seeks to Enforce a Tribunal's Order 
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A party to an administrative action may also, exceptionally, bring an action against 
another party in court to enforce the tribunal's order. For example, a group of teachers 
successfully sought to enforce an arbitrator's order that a school board annually set aside 
certain funds for teachers' professional development.63 Sara Blake has suggested that the 
party's success "may depend on whether the tribunal order is of a type that a court would 
enforce, and whether the court believes it should enforce the tribunal order in the absence 
of any statutory procedure for obtaining court assistance."64 In other words, courts may 
be more likely to grant a private application to enforce a tribunal order where the court 
recognizes the tribunal's order as similar to the kind of order that a court might make. 
However, the private applicant will first have the difficult task of convincing the court 
that it should intervene in this way, even though there may be no statutory provision 
explicitly empowering it to do so. 
C. Criminal Prosecution 
Many statutes provide for quasi-criminal prosecution of persons who disobey tribunal 
orders. Quasi-criminal offences are prosecuted by the federal or provincial Crown, as 
appropriate, and they carry penalties that include fines and imprisonment. For example, a 
person who commits an offence under s 155 of the BC Securities Act65 is liable to a fine 
of not more than $3 million, to imprisonment for not more than three years, or both. 
Indictable offences under the federal Fisheries Act66 may attract, at their upper end, fines 
of up to $500,000 or imprisonment for up two years, or both.67 
In the absence of other provisions, it is a criminal offence to disobey a lawful order of 
a federal or provincial tribunal. The federal Criminal Code states: 
 127(1). Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a 
court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give 
the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other 
mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years; or 
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(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.68 
The Criminal Code provision is only available where no other penalty is expressly 
provided by law. What does this mean? Superior courts' own contempt powers do not 
generally count as an "other mode of proceeding" for purposes of this section.69 Most 
administrative tribunals do not have the ability to make contempt orders on their own. 
Therefore, the Criminal Code provisions should apply where no "punishment or other 
mode of proceeding" is explicitly set out in the tribunal's enabling statute. This has been 
held not to violate the constitutional separation of powers, even when dealing with 
provincial tribunals, on the basis that the provincial tribunal is still making orders that are 
non-criminal. Parliament, acting within its sphere, is the one that has decided that breach 
of those provincial provisions is a criminal offence.70 
IV. Challenging Administrative Action Without Going to Court 
A party to an administrative action may also decide to challenge that administrative 
action itself. The possible bases for a party's challenge are described in other chapters in 
this text. For example, a party may challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction, its procedure, its 
impartiality, or the substance of its final decision. Each of these usually amounts to a 
direct or indirect challenge to the remedies or orders the tribunal imposes. Sometimes, 
these challenges are made through applications for what in administrative law is called 
“judicial review.” However, applications for judicial review, like litigation generally, can 
be expensive and drawn-out affairs. Moreover, it is important to be realistic about what 
can be achieved through judicial review. In order to bring a successful judicial review 
application, a challenger must be aware of the specific remedial mechanisms available 
and how those mechanisms will help them achieve the result that they want. For example, 
as the Gitxaala Nation example shows, a motion to quash a tribunal decision, if 
successful, will usually only lead to the court sending the matter back to the original 
tribunal for rehearing.71 This result may not satisfy the challenger. Even assuming that 
proper procedure is observed the second time, there is no guarantee that the party will 
receive the substantive outcome they seek. 
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For these reasons, parties seeking to challenge administrative action should consider 
their options carefully. This part of the chapter outlines the various review mechanisms 
available, including both non-court mechanisms and court-based mechanisms. We begin 
first with mechanisms that are internal to the administrative apparatus itself, then move to 
mechanisms that exist externally to both the administrative agency and courts (for 
example, ombudspersons), finally turning to court-based mechanisms. Here we 
distinguish between appeals and judicial review, and discuss private law or alternative 
monetary remedies that may exist against administrative decision-makers. 
A. Internal Tribunal Mechanisms 
A party considering a challenge to tribunal action will need to understand the 
particular tribunal's structure and capacity, as established by its enabling statute. All 
tribunals can fix certain things, such as clerical errors or factual errors due to mistake or 
dishonesty, without express statutory authority. This is sometimes called the "slip rule."72 
Tribunals can also "change their minds" until the time a final decision is made. Therefore, 
what constitutes a "final decision" is important. For example, if a statute provides that 
final decisions must be in writing, then only written decisions will constitute final 
decisions. Preliminary rulings can also be changed until the final decision on a matter has 
been made.73 
Some enabling statutes specifically provide tribunals with the ability to reconsider 
and rehear decisions they have made. This is most common where a particular tribunal 
has ongoing regulatory responsibility over a particular domain, such as public utilities 
regulation or employer–employee relations. For example, the Public Service Labour 
Relations Act provides, "[s]ubject to subsection (2) [prohibiting retroactive effect of any 
rights acquired], the Board may review, rescind or amend any of its orders or decisions, 
or may rehear any application before making an order in respect of the application."74 
Absent such express statutory authority, however, for policy reasons that favour finality 
of proceedings, a tribunal cannot reconsider or alter a final decision made within its 
jurisdiction. Once it has made a final decision, the tribunal is functus officio.75 
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As a next-best alternative for challenging a tribunal decision, consider that some 
administrative tribunals are part of multi-tiered administrative agencies. Those tribunals' 
enabling statutes may provide for appeals internal to the administrative agency itself. For 
example, parties appearing before Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board Immigration 
Division may appeal to its Immigration Appeal Division.76 Similarly, provincial 
securities acts across the country provide that persons directly affected by decisions made 
by Securities Commission staff may appeal to (or, in some statutes, seek "review" from) 
the commission itself, to which staff report.77 Again, parties should be aware that internal 
appellate structures may not look much like courts. 
These internal review proceedings do not preclude subsequent appeals to the courts. 
Indeed, the various provincial securities acts mentioned above provide for appeals under 
limited conditions from their internal appellate bodies to the courts. These are called 
"statutory appeals." Where the statute does not provide for an appeal to the courts, the 
parties' only access to the courts is by means of judicial review. However, as discussed in 
more detail below, where a statute provides for reconsideration or internal administrative 
appeals within a multi-tiered agency, a challenger will generally be expected to exhaust 
those avenues before making an application for judicial review. 
One of the more interesting innovations in internal administrative appeals was created 
in 1996, with the passage of Quebec's Administrative Justice Act.78 The statute creates the 
Tribunal administratif du Québec (TAQ), a supertribunal that hears "proceedings" 
brought against almost all administrative tribunals and public bodies in the province, 
including government departments, boards, commissions, municipalities, and health-care 
bodies.79 As a practical matter, this means that there is now one main appellate/review 
body for administrative matters in the province. According to the Act, the tribunal's 
purpose is "to affirm the specific character of administrative justice, to ensure its quality, 
promptness and accessibility and to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens."80 It is 
an administrative (that is, executive branch) institution, not a judicial one, but its remedial 
powers include judicial review-style options and (surprisingly for common law 
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administrative lawyers) the ability to substitute its decision for an original tribunal's: "[i]n 
the case of the contestation of a decision, the Tribunal may confirm, vary or quash the 
contested decision and, if appropriate, make the decision which, in its opinion, should 
have been made initially."81 Where the TAQ has jurisdiction to consider a proceeding, 
claimants should exhaust the remedies available from it rather than trying to circumvent 
the administrative process.82 Avenues of appeal from the TAQ to the Superior Court of 
Quebec are limited.83 
B. External Non-Court Mechanisms 
A party considering a challenge to administrative action should also not overlook 
non-legal avenues. For example, ombudspersons or similar positions exist by statute in 
every Canadian province. There is no overarching federal ombudsperson, but some 
federal departments and subject areas have their own specialized ombudspersons. 
Generally, the mandate of an ombudsperson is to provide a forum for citizens to bring 
their complaints regarding the way that government departments and agencies have dealt 
with them. There is no charge to make a complaint to an ombudsperson. Ombudspersons 
have discretion as to whether or not they will investigate a complaint. 
An ongoing issue has been the degree to which an ombudsperson can assert 
jurisdiction with respect to administrative tribunal decisions and processes (as opposed to 
the general run of government departments and ministries—that is, public servants not 
possessing the statutorily created decision-making structure that tribunals have). Most 
legislation defines the ombudsperson's jurisdiction as being over "matters of 
administration," and courts have tended to define "administration" expansively as 
involving generic administrative processes, not simply as the antonym of "judicial" 
processes.84 Among the tribunals themselves, the range of bodies subject to an 
                                               
81 Ibid, s 15. 
82 Okwuobi v Lester B Pearson School Board; Casimir v Quebec (Attorney General); 
Zorrilla v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 16, [2005] 1 SCR 257. 
83 The tribunal is composed of four divisions (social affairs, immovable property, 
territory and environment, and economic affairs), but, per s 159 of the Act, an appeal to 
the court is only available from the immovable property division and from decisions 
regarding the preservation of agricultural land. This tracks the appeals that were available 
from those tribunals before the TAQ was created; the TAQ replaced a plethora of 
administrative appeal bodies, but was not intended to increase the number of available 
appeals to the courts. 
84 For example, in British Columbia Development Corporation v Friedmann 
(Ombudsman), [1984] 2 SCR 447, the Supreme Court ruled that policy-making activities 
of provincial Crown corporations were "matters of administration" for the purposes of the 
Ombudsman Act. The Ontario Court of Appeal has interpreted the ombudsperson's 
 
ombudsperson's investigatory powers can be quite broad. In Ontario, for example, the 
courts have held that even largely independent bodies can be subject to ombuds review if 
the government pays its members' wages.85 However, most ombuds statutes provide that 
an ombudsperson is not authorized to investigate a tribunal's decision until after any right 
of appeal or review on the merits has been exercised or until after the time limit for doing 
so has expired.86 
Several other public officials similar to ombudspersons also exist, including freedom 
of information and privacy commissioners, the auditor general, provincial auditors, and 
human rights commissioners. While harder for individuals to instigate, public inquiries 
are another mechanism for challenging government conduct.87 
C. Using the Courts  
Finally, there are the courts. The ability to challenge administrative action in the 
courts is a mixed, but necessary, blessing. On the downside, even leaving aside some 
very serious concerns about costs and access to justice, courts may be reluctant to 
embrace novel, non-courtlike, yet potentially effective remedies devised by specialized 
tribunals. The richness and creativity that may characterize administrative law remedies 
could be stifled by potentially over-judicialized, overly interventionist court scrutiny. 
This is one reason that the internal appeal mechanisms described above, which permit 
decisions to be reviewed by higher-level bodies within the administrative agency 
structure itself, make sense. On the other hand, there are times—among others, during 
national emergencies—when executive action unquestionably needs to be subject to the 
rule of law, as applied by independent courts.88 As with so many things in administrative 
                                               
jurisdiction over "administration of a government agency" to include investigations into 
matters determined by administrative tribunals: Ombudsman of Ontario v Ontario 
(Labour Relations Board) (1986), 44 DLR (4th) 312 (Ont CA). 
85 Ontario (Ombudsman) v Ontario (Health Disciplines Board) (1979), 104 DLR (3d) 
597 (Ont CA). 
86 See e.g. the Yukon Ombudsman Act, RSY 2002, c 163, s 12. The Manitoba 
Ombudsman Act, CCSM c O45, s 18(d) and the Saskatchewan Ombudsman and 
Children's Advocate Act, RSS 1978, c O-4, s 15(1)(d) provide that rights of appeal or 
review preclude an ombudsperson's intervention "unless the Ombudsman is satisfied that 
in the particular case it would have been unreasonable to expect the complainant to resort 
to the tribunal or court," although the time limitation for appeal or review must still have 
run. 
87 See Peter Carver, Getting the Story Out: Accountability and the Law of Public 
Inquiries [on the website]. 
88 See Chapter 4, Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative 
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law, context matters in thinking about the legitimacy of each alternative. There may be 
times when it makes sense to maintain the integrity of the administrative regime through 
all internal appeal stages. There may also be times when what is required is faster and 
unapologetic recourse to the courts—for example, allowing a party to "leapfrog" the 
internal appeals and proceed directly to judicial review. 
There are two main ways by which a party to a tribunal action can access the courts to 
challenge that action: appeal and judicial review. Appeal mechanisms—either to internal 
administrative appellate bodies or to courts—are provided for in the statutory scheme 
itself. The scope of a possible appeal is confined to what the statute expressly provides. 
Courts still struggle sometimes with knotty issues in taking appeals from administrative 
tribunals, but relative to judicial review it is easier to determine whether internal appeals 
or statutory appeals to the courts are available: one just has to read the statute. By 
contrast, judicial review is an exceptional remedy that goes beyond what the statute 
provides for.89 Significantly, judicial review is also discretionary. Judicial review 
doctrine is the product of decades of contentious court battles, modified from time to time 
by statute, directly pitting "legal" values of justice and the rule of law against 
"democratic" values and legislative intent, as well as "bureaucratic" values such as 
efficiency and expertise. Even the seemingly basic questions of whether judicial review is 
available in a particular situation, and what remedies are available, have been shaped by 
these contests. 
Regardless of whether a party exercises a statutory right of appeal, where available, 
or seeks judicial review, that court decision can be appealed further up the judicial 
hierarchy.90 
1. Statutory Rights of Appeal to the Courts 
Below are the major questions a party must ask to determine whether an appeal from 
a tribunal to the courts is available to them. 
a. Does the Tribunal's Enabling Statute Provide for a Right of Appeal? 
                                               
treated differently: consider Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 
SCR 44 [Khadr]. 
89 David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 462.  
90 When reviewing a statutory appeal from an administrative actor or a judicial review, an 
appellate court should “step into the shoes” of the court that initially conducted the 
judicial review, determining whether the judge selected the appropriate standard of 
review and applied it correctly: Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 SCR 559 at paras 46-47. 
 
Courts have no inherent appellate jurisdiction over administrative tribunals.91 A 
tribunal's enabling statute may provide for a right to appeal to the courts. If it does not, 
then quite simply there is no such appeal. A dissatisfied party could only access the 
courts by way of the exceptional remedy of judicial review, described below. Moreover, 
parties generally may not appeal interlocutory rulings (for example, on jurisdiction, 
procedural or evidentiary issues, or bias).92 To be appealable, the tribunal's decision must 
decide the merits of the matter or otherwise be a final disposition of it.93 
Usually, a tribunal's enabling statute will also set out the court to which tribunal 
orders may be appealed. For federal tribunals, appeals are usually taken to the Federal 
Court or the Federal Court of Appeal.94 Appeals from provincially constituted tribunals 
may be taken, depending on what the enabling statute says, to the province's trial court of 
general jurisdiction,95 to a divisional court,96 or to a court of appeal.97 Rarely, a statute 
will provide a right (seldom exercised) to appeal a tribunal decision to Cabinet itself.98 
b. What Is the Scope of Available Appeal? 
Just as the enabling statute determines whether a statutory appeal is available in the 
first place, the enabling statute entirely determines its scope. That scope varies from 
tribunal to tribunal. Some statutes permit complete de novo review of a tribunal's 
decision, while others will be limited to issues of law based entirely on the record. In 
other words, an appellate court's jurisdiction in reviewing tribunal decisions may be 
                                               
91 Medora v Dental Society, 56 NBR (2d) 145 at 147, [1984] NBJ No 236 (QL) (CA). 
92 Mary & David Goodine Dairy Farm v New Brunswick (Milk Marketing Board), 2002 
NBCA 38, 217 DLR (4th) 708, [2002] NBJ No 177; Roosma v Ford Motor Co of Canada 
Ltd (1988), 66 OR (2d) 18 (Div Ct); Newfoundland Transport Ltd v Newfoundland 
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93 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Ontario Teachers' Federation, 19 OR (3d) 371, 
[1994] OJ No 1585 (QL) (Gen Div); Prince Albert (City) v Riocan Holding Inc, 2004 
SKCA 73, 241 DLR (4th) 308 (CA). 
94 Respectively, see e.g. Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13, s 56; and Competition 
Tribunal Act, supra note 50, s 13. 
95 See e.g. Nunavut’s Travel and Tourism Act, RSNWT 1988, c T-7, s 8. 
96 See e.g. Ontario’s Expropriations Act, RSO 1990, c E26, s 31. 
97 See e.g. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Law Society Act, 1999, SNL 1999, c L-9.1, s 
55. 
98 See e.g. Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c 11, s 28. 
 
different in scope from an appellate court's jurisdiction in reviewing lower court 
decisions. A court that has been designated to take appeals from a tribunal's decision 
must look to the tribunal's enabling statute to determine the breadth and scope of its 
appellate powers. Often, for example, enabling statutes will provide for a statutory right 
of appeal from an administrative decision-maker only on questions of law or 
jurisdiction.99 
Arguably, the scope of an available appeal is determined by how closely the tribunal's 
subject matter, and its expertise, mirror the mandate and expertise of general courts. 
Statutes are more likely to provide a right of appeal to the courts where the tribunal has 
the power to affect individual rights (for example, human rights tribunals, land-use 
planning tribunals, and professional licensing). Labour relations and employment-related 
matters, which have long been adjudicated by tripartite boards with specialized expertise 
and which involve claims by organized labour to which courts were historically perceived 
to be hostile, cannot generally be appealed to the courts.100 The same considerations 
affect the scope of available appeal. A statute is more likely to provide for a right of 
appeal to the courts where individual rights are at stake. For example, statutes generally 
provide for a broad power to appeal from certain professional disciplinary tribunals on 
questions of fact and law, where professionals risk losing their ability to practice their 
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Perspective,” (2013) 38:2 Queen’s LJ 391-418 at 400. 
 
profession,101 and from human rights tribunals adjudicating on violations of human rights 
codes.102  
Yet even where the appeal rights are broad, courts will show deference to a tribunal’s 
decisions, in order to respect the legislative intention to give a specialized tribunal 
responsibility for a particular statutory regime, and because of the tribunal’s expertise and 
its familiarity with its own legislative scheme. Note that the standard of review on a 
statutory appeal from an administrative decision is generally “reasonableness.” That is, 
unlike an appeal from a trial court to an appellate court, the question is not whether the 
original decision-maker made an error of law, or committed a palpable and overriding 
error of fact.103 Most of the time, the question on a statutory appeal from an 
administrative decision-maker, as it is on judicial review, is not whether the decision-
maker’s decision was correct, but whether it was reasonable.104 Standard of review is 
discussed in detail in Chapters 11 and 12 of this text.  
Below are a few more considerations relevant to statutory appeals from 
administrative tribunals. 
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102 See e.g. Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 11, s 42(3); also Zurich Insurance 
Co v Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1992] 2 SCR 321 at 336-38. 
103 In Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770 [Wilson] 
at paras 14-16, the Court stated that the standard of review on an appeal from a judicial 
review was still reasonableness (overruling the Federal Court of Appeal in Wilson v 
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2015 FCA 17, which had held at paras 25-26 and 34 
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104 Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 SCR 3 at 
paras 38, 46 (“Where a court reviews a decision of a specialized administrative tribunal, 
the standard of review must be determined on the basis of administrative law principles 
… regardless of whether the review is conducted in the context of an application for 
judicial review or of a statutory appeal,” and “on judicial review of a decision of a 
specialized administrative tribunal interpreting and applying its enabling statute, it should 
be presumed that the standard of review is reasonableness”); also Edmonton East, supra 
note 99 at paras 22-31. In Edmonton East, the Court split 5:4, with a forceful dissent, on 
the question of whether the standard of review was necessarily reasonableness, when the 
statutory regime provided for a right of appeal from the administrative decision-maker to 
the courts. However, all judges apparently agreed that statutory appeals from 
administrative decision-makers should be conducted on the basis of administrative law 
principles.  
 
c. Is an Appeal Available as of Right, or Is Leave Required? If Leave Is Required, 
Who May Grant It? 
Appeals can be as of right or require leave. Where leave must be obtained, it can be 
the leave either of the original decision-maker or, more frequently, of the appellate body 
(that is, the court). For example, British Columbia's Forest Practices Code105 provides for 
an appeal as of right from the Forest Appeals Commission to the BC Supreme Court on 
questions of law or jurisdiction. By contrast, a person affected by a decision of the BC 
Securities Commission may appeal to the BC Court of Appeal only with leave of a justice 
of that court.106 Sometimes, additional statutory criteria must also be met before such 
leave will be granted.107 
d. Is a Stay of Proceedings Automatic, or Must One Apply for It? 
The rules governing stays of proceedings vary between jurisdictions and even 
tribunals. Specific enabling statutes may expressly empower their tribunals or the 
appellate bodies (internal or court) to which they appeal to stay enforcement of the 
tribunal order pending appeal.108 The Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act109 
establishes a default rule that an appeal operates as a stay of a tribunal's proceedings.110 
The BC ATA, by contrast, provides that "the commencement of an appeal does not 
operate as a stay or suspend the operation of the decision being appealed unless the 
tribunal orders otherwise."111 In the Federal Court, as well, stays of proceedings are 
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107 For example, an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal from judicial review by the 
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usually discretionary.112 Unless a statute specifically excludes it, as BC's ATA does, the 
superior court that is the tribunal's designated appellate court has the inherent authority to 
grant a stay.113 
Like the legislative decision to permit appeals as of right or only with leave, a 
legislative decision to make a stay automatic or not says something about how the 
legislature views the tribunals in question. Requiring potential appellants to apply for 
leave to appeal places an additional hurdle before them. Automatically staying a 
tribunal's decision holds its powers in abeyance while a court checks the tribunal's 
decision. Where the legislature decides that stays will not be automatic, the legislature 
may choose to allocate the power to order a stay either to the tribunal or to a court. These 
statutory drafting decisions reflect the legislature's assessment of the proper balancing of 
rule-of-law and efficiency concerns, the balance between tribunal expertise and judicial 
oversight, and the legislature's comfort with granting broad autonomy to the relevant 
tribunal. 
D. Using the Courts: Judicial Review 
Now, finally, we discuss judicial review, the parallel universe under whose rules the 
outcome in Gitxaala Nation could be considered some sort of victory for the Gitxaala.  
Judicial review has long been the fixation of administrative law, at the expense of 
tribunal-based and extralegal mechanisms and statutory appeals—not to mention the 
hugely important arena of administrative rulemaking—in part because administrative law 
is created primarily by judges, lawyers, and legal scholars. The legal training these 
individuals receive is, understandably, preoccupied with legal mechanisms and, in 
particular, with courts and the common law. This makes for an overly narrow lens. And 
yet, having placed judicial review in its broader context, it nonetheless deserves careful 
attention. Judicial review can be conceptually and logistically complex, and it differs 
from a straightforward appeal. The outcome in Gitxaala Nation was a function of the 
available judicial review remedies.  
As we shall see throughout this volume, the basic nature of judicial review is different 
from statutory or internal tribunal appeals because, at its root, judicial review is about the 
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stays of claims against the Crown under certain conditions. In Cardoza Quinteros v 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 643 at paras 10, 13, the Federal Court 
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inherent jurisdiction of courts to oversee and check administrative (that is, executive) 
action in the interest of the rule of law. This makes it a potentially sweeping remedy. 
Unlike appeals from tribunals, which are statutorily created, judicial review is the review 
of executive action beyond what the legislature provided for.  
Here are four things to know about judicial review: first, courts always and 
fundamentally retain the discretion to hear, or not to hear, an application for judicial 
review. Second, in addition to overcoming the fundamentally discretionary nature of 
judicial review, an applicant will need to cross some specific thresholds in order to be 
heard. Third, the historical development of the remedies available through judicial review 
has actively shaped, and limited, the possibilities and potential of judicial review itself. In 
spite of statutory reform and evolving case law, the ancient prerogative writs that were 
the original forms of judicial review continue to haunt its present forms. And finally, in 
response to the apparent disconnect between what some parties may want by way of 
remedies and what they can obtain on judicial review, some interesting private law and 
monetary damages-oriented remedies have sprung up around the edges of judicial review. 
Each of these points is developed in more detail below. 
1. Discretionary Bases for Refusing a Remedy 
A court's decision whether to grant judicial review is intimately bound up with the 
core tension that underlies all of administrative law—what the Supreme Court has called 
"an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle, 
which finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create 
various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers."114 Courts are the 
indispensable guardians of the rule of law, but they still need to operate within their 
sphere of authority. This means respecting the fact that, through enabling statutes, 
legislatures grant authority over certain things to administrative tribunals, and not to the 
courts. A lot of administrative law jurisprudence is devoted to trying to negotiate a path 
through the difficult territory on the borders of the branches' spheres of authority. What 
concerns us here is the threshold question of whether to grant judicial review at all—
before considering the merits of the case, before figuring out the standard of review, and 
before determining the degree of procedural fairness a party is entitled to. Judicial review 
is fundamentally discretionary in a way that appeals are not. A court has the discretion to 
refuse to grant a remedy even where one seems clearly warranted on the facts.115 
 The original set of discretionary grounds for refusing relief derive from common 
law and equity, and they have survived the statutory reform of judicial review. They are 
reminiscent of similar equity-based grounds in civil procedure, such as laches 
(unreasonable delay), or unconscionability: 
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1. The most important basis for refusing to grant a remedy in judicial review 
is discussed in more detail below: that adequate alternative remedies are available.116 
Parties should exhaust all other legal avenues for review before proceeding to the "last 
resort" of judicial review. 
2. Judicial review applications that are brought before tribunal proceedings 
have been concluded are usually dismissed as being premature. This includes challenges 
to the tribunal's interim procedural and evidentiary rulings. The policy rationales that 
underlie dismissals for prematurity include: (a) that administrative action is meant to be 
more cost-effective than court proceedings, and interim judicial review fragments and 
protracts those proceedings; (b) that preliminary complaints may become moot as the 
proceedings progress; and (c) that the court will be in a better position to assess the 
situation once a full and complete record of tribunal proceedings exists.117 A judge on 
judicial review retains the discretion to hear an early application; there is no “hard and 
fast rule” that prevents reviewing interim decisions.118 However, to obtain judicial review 
of a tribunal's preliminary or interim ruling, an applicant must generally show exceptional 
circumstances, the presence of which mean the applicant should not be forced to wait 
until the administrative proceeding concludes. This is particularly true where the 
evidentiary record is not complete, factual issues have not been resolved, or the tribunal’s 
expertise has not yet been brought to bear on relevant issues.119 Evidence of irreparable 
harm, prejudice, costs, or delay, or the absence of an appropriate remedy at the end of the 
proceedings may constitute special or exceptional circumstances.120 Concerns that do not 
qualify include those about procedural fairness or bias, jurisdictional issues, the presence of 
an important legal or constitutional issue, or the fact that all parties have consented to 
seeking judicial review early.121 
3. Even if statutory time limits for filing a judicial review application have 
been met, parties must be aware that delay and acquiescence may be grounds for a 
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reviewing court to refuse a remedy.122 Parties should object promptly to any perceived 
impropriety on the part of the tribunal. Similarly, choosing not to attend a hearing could 
waive any right to judicial review. 
4. A remedy in judicial review will not be granted where the issues are moot. 
This may be the case where a dispute is over or has not yet arisen, where a tribunal's 
order has expired or no longer affects the applicant, or where the litigant no longer 
actually wants the remedy that the tribunal might have granted had it not erred.123  
5. The court will use its discretion to refuse to grant a remedy on judicial 
review where the party making the judicial review application does not come with clean 
hands. This could include seeking a remedy to facilitate illegal conduct or to obtain an 
unfair advantage, or flouting the law or making misrepresentations.124 
By the 1990s, these long-standing grounds for refusing relief came to be overlaid 
with a different vision of judicial review that reflected a new sensitivity to separation of 
powers issues, and increased deference toward administrative tribunals. The overarching 
presumption of judicial deference toward administrative decision-making percolated 
throughout the judicial review process, eventually reaching the discretionary grounds for 
granting relief in the first place. In other words, even where the five original grounds 
above were not present, courts began to recognize that it could sometimes be appropriate 
to refuse to grant judicial review out of deference to tribunals' unique institutional roles. 
Perhaps the most forceful statement about the contingent nature of judicial review 
remedies from this era comes from Domtar Inc. v Quebec.125 In deciding not to intervene 
to resolve a conflict in legal interpretation between two tribunals construing the same 
statutory language, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, "[t]he advisability of judicial 
intervention in the event of conflicting decisions among administrative tribunals, even 
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when serious and unquestionable, cannot, in these circumstances, be determined solely by 
the 'triumph' of the rule of law."126 The court went on to articulate what was then a novel, 
and striking, notion: that even the most deeply cherished rule-of-law values will not 
always point the way to the only, or perhaps even the most appropriate, response to a 
problem in administrative law: 
[C]ertainty of the law and decision-making consistency are chiefly notable for 
their relativity. Like the rules of natural justice, these objectives cannot be absolute in 
nature regardless of the context. The value represented by the decision-making 
independence and autonomy of the members of administrative tribunals goes hand in 
hand here with the principle that their decisions should be effective. In light of these 
considerations we must conclude that, for purposes of judicial review, the principle of the 
rule of law must be qualified. This is consistent with the continuing evolution of 
administrative law itself.127 
 Consistent with this, in 1999, Chief Justice McLachlin set forth a vision of a "new 
rule of law," which would 
[make] it possible for institutions other than courts to play key roles in 
maintaining it. It opens the door to the idea that courts do not necessarily have a 
monopoly on the values of reasons and fairness … [C]ontrary to Dicey's view that the 
courts' primary role is to constrain, limit and, if possible eliminate administrative power, 
the new Rule of Law allows courts to respect and advance the roles of administrative 
tribunals. The courts' role shifts from being a brute guardian of an artificial and restrictive 
Rule of Law to that of a partner.128 
 In this way, courts moved past the restrictive traditional grounds for refusing to 
exercise discretion to grant judicial review. They did so in the service of a more 
respectful relationship with the other branches of government, and particularly with 
administrative tribunals. But to the extent that this shift could be read as introducing 
some poorly-defined, deferential "X factor" into the decision-making process, it risked 
exempting courts from the very ethos of justification that tribunals were expected to 
observe in their decision-making. Surely this would be a misreading. The fact that 
judicial review is discretionary does not mean that courts should refuse to grant judicial 
review solely on the basis of some abstract ideal of partnership with administrative 
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tribunals, or a relative and qualified rule-of-law value. Respecting, protecting, and 
adhering to the rule of law means that judges should base even their discretionary 
decisions on identifiable reasons. 
Today, in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant judicial review, a 
court adopts a multi-factorial, contextual approach that nevertheless draws some insight 
from the traditional grounds described above. Deference to tribunals at the point of 
deciding whether to grant judicial review is understood to be consistent with normal 
judicial review analysis, which generally aims to strike the balance between the courts' 
essential role in upholding the rule of law, while avoiding "undue interference" with 
administrative powers.129 While the factors to be considered in exercising the discretion 
“cannot be reduced to a checklist or a statement of general rules,”130 there is guidance to 
be had. In Khosa, the court stated that the discretion to grant or withhold judicial review 
“must be exercised judicially and in accordance with proper principles."131 In setting out 
those proper principles, the court identified the standard of review principles that govern 
administrative law generally, and which are discussed in other chapters of this book, plus 
the traditional grounds as identified and described above: “other factors such as an 
applicant's delay, failure to exhaust adequate alternate remedies, mootness, prematurity, 
bad faith and so forth.”132 In MiningWatch (per coram with Rothstein J writing), the court 
added another consideration. It is one that has been rising in salience since Khosa: the 
balance of convenience to the various parties.133 In an interesting juxtaposition to the 
Domtar language, which had proposed that the rule of law must sometimes be qualified, 
MiningWatch observes that, because the discretionary power to refuse judicial review 
“may make inroads upon the rule of law, it must be exercised with the greatest care.”134 \ 
 
2. Is Judicial Review Available? Threshold Questions 
                                               
129 See especially Dunsmuir, supra note 11411 at paras 20-24. 
130 Strickland, supra note 11512 at para 45 (in considering whether adequate alternative 
remedies had been exhausted). 
131 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 SCR 339 
[Khosa], at para 40. 
132 Ibid at para 51. 
133 MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 SCR 
6 at para 52 [MiningWatch]; see also Khosa, supra note 142 at paras 36, 133-35. In that 
case, the balance of convenience justified reducing the impact of the remedy granted, 
from relief in the nature of certiorari and mandamus to a declaration. (These specific 
forms of relief are discussed below.) 
134 MiningWatch at para 52. 
 
Leaving to one side what the cases above have said about the discretionary nature of 
judicial review writ large, the unique history, purpose, and mechanics of judicial review 
also mean that whether it will be available in any particular situation depends on a set of 
considerations particular to administrative law.135 
One of the key threshold questions is whether the tribunal whose actions are being 
challenged is, in fact, a public body. Judicial review is available to check executive 
action. Therefore, only public bodies can be subject to judicial review.136 While this may 
sound straightforward, some organizations in Canadian society operate at considerable 
remove from government, yet exercise some degree of "public" function. Others seem 
private, but have some connection to public authority. For example, stock exchanges 
regulate the conduct of their members and issue and revoke licences, and their operations 
clearly go to the protection of the public. However, their authority to act as they do 
derives from a compact with their members rather than from any statutory grant of 
authority. Similarly, one should distinguish between government-acting-as-the-state, and 
government-acting-as-private-contracting-party. As a general matter, a private party will 
have difficulty seeking judicial review of a government board's decision not to award it a 
particular contract.137 As well, public employees with employment contracts will have 
                                               
135 For this chapter’s purposes, we will assume that the court in question has the 
jurisdiction to grant judicial review. Note, however, that preliminary objections about a 
subject’s justiciability have been raised in the Crown prerogative context: in Hupacasath 
First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada), 2015 FCA 4, 
379 DLR (4th) 737, a First Nation alleged that a foreign investment agreement between 
Canada and the People’s Republic of China might affect Aboriginal rights and interests 
that it had asserted over territory in British Columbia, and that Canada had a duty to 
consult with it and if necessary to accommodate its concerns before the agreement came 
into force. Canada argued that decisions to enter into international agreements and 
treaties are exercises of federal Crown prerogative power, over which the Federal Court 
has no jurisdiction. In its decision, the Federal Court of Appeal declined to follow 
Ontario Court of Appeal jurisprudence holding that the Federal Courts had no jurisdiction 
over exercises of the Crown prerogative, and further held that exercises of pure federal 
Crown prerogative are justiciable. For more on the interplay between aboriginal law and 
administrative law, see Chapter 3, Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law. The fact 
that government is exercising the Crown prerogative can also affect the scope of 
remedies a court is prepared to grant: see Khadr, supra note 87, in which it limited the 
appropriate remedy to a declaration.  
136 Private actors may also owe a duty of fairness that can be enforced through the private 
law remedies of declaration and injunction; however, these remedies are outside the 
scope of this chapter. 
137 But consider the improper purpose doctrine: Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver 
(City), [1994] 1 SCR 231. 
 
their employment relationships governed by private (contract) law, not public 
(administrative) law.138  
Various factors go into determining whether a particular tribunal is a private body or 
a public one. Relevant considerations include whether the matter at issue is of a more 
public or more private character; the nature of the decision-maker and the nature of its 
relationships to a statutory scheme or to government action; whether the decision being 
challenged was authorized by a public source of law; and whether public law remedies 
would be “suitable.”139 
In addition to determining whether a tribunal is a sufficiently “public” body, a party 
seeking to challenge administrative action should determine whether they have standing 
to challenge a tribunal decision. The answer will be straightforward for individuals who 
are actual parties to an administrative action, but other persons may have a collateral 
interest in the same matter and may want to challenge a tribunal order that does not 
directly affect them.140 There is also discretionary “public interest standing,” under which 
an individual or group may be able to challenge administrative action on behalf of 
others.141 Given that tribunals are expected to maintain a degree of impartiality, courts 
will also exercise their discretion in deciding whether and to what degree a tribunal 
should be able to participate when a party challenges its administrative action.142 Lorne 
Sossin discusses standing in greater detail in Chapter XX.  
                                               
138 Dunsmuir, supra note 11411 especially at paras 79-83, 112-17. 
139 Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347 at para 60; see also McDonald v 
Anishinabek Police Service (2006), 83 OR (3d) 132 (Div Ct) (decisions by the chief of a 
police service created through a combination of contract and statute could be judicially 
reviewed); Attawapiskat First Nation, supra note 121 at paras 50-62; Setia v Appleby 
College, 2013 ONCA 753 (a private high school’s decision to expel a student could not 
be judicially reviewed); West Toronto United Football Club v Ontario Soccer 
Association, 2014 ONSC 5881 (a provincial soccer association’s decision to intervene in 
a disputed match decision was judicially reviewable). 
140 See e.g. Globalive Wireless Management Corp v Public Mobile Inc, 2011 FCA 194. 
141 The leading case is Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers 
United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, para 37, under which the test is: “(1) 
whether there is a serious justiciable issue raised; (2) whether the plaintiff has a real stake 
or a genuine interest in it; and (3) whether, in all the circumstances, the proposed suit is a 
reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.”  
142 Considerations include whether there is any other party with the necessary knowledge 
and expertise to stand in opposition to the party challenging the administrative action; 
whether the tribunal has a more policy-oriented or adjudicatory, dispute resolution 
oriented role; and what limits need to be imposed to ensure that the tribunal is not 
 
Third, a party seeking to challenge administrative action should determine to which 
court they should apply for judicial review. Both the provincial superior courts and the 
federal courts have judicial review jurisdiction. Although a tribunal's enabling statute will 
generally set out which court has jurisdiction to hear a statutory appeal to the courts, this 
is not the case for judicial review. (This makes sense, because judicial review is an 
extraordinary remedy that the enabling statute does not provide for in the first place.) 
Typically, the choice of courts is determined by whether the source of the impugned 
authority's power is provincial or federal.143 Some overarching provincial statutes, such 
as Ontario's Judicial Review Procedure Act, stipulate the particular provincial court to 
which judicial review applications should be brought.144 
Fourth, a party should ensure that they have not missed any deadlines. Some statutes 
impose time limits within which a party must file an application for judicial review. For 
example, the Federal Courts Act states that a judicial review application from a federal 
tribunal to the Federal Court must be made within 30 days of the time the underlying 
decision or order is first communicated.145 In Alberta, the rules impose a six-month time 
                                               
“bootstrapping” a weak decision by, e.g. introducing new arguments after the fact: 
Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc, 2015 SCC 414, [2015] 3 SCR 
147, paras 52-59, 63-69. 
143 There are some exceptions. Provincial superior courts have concurrent or exclusive 
jurisdiction over some specific aspects of federal statutory regimes, as a result of both the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, and 
the Federal Courts Act, supra note 109. In particular, provincial superior courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction where Charter issues are raised in attacks on federal legislative 
regimes (Reza v Canada, [1994] 2 SCR 394) and—although this is private law, not 
judicial review—over damages actions in which relief is sought against the federal 
Crown (Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc, 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 SCR 585 
[TeleZone]). On the Crown prerogative see also Hupacasath, supra note 13534, and on 
concurrent jurisdiction more generally, see also Strickland, supra note 1152 at paras 16-
33 (affirming the Federal Court’s refusal to hear a judicial review of family law child 
support guidelines on the basis that the provincial superior courts were the more 
appropriate forum). 
144 Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA), RSO 1990, c J 1, s 6 says that judicial 
review applications shall be made to the Divisional Court, unless “the case is one of 
urgency and … the delay required for an application to the Divisional Court is likely to 
involve a failure of justice,” in which case an application may be made to the Superior 
Court of Justice. 
145 Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18.1(2). The deadline can be extended: see, e.g. 
Canada (Attorney General) v Larkman, 2012 FCA 204. 
 
limit on all applications for judicial review, except habeas corpus applications.146 Nova 
Scotia precludes all applications for judicial review after the earlier of six months 
following the decision, or 25 days after the decision is communicated to the person.147 In 
British Columbia, the general time limit is 60 days.148 Parties should therefore check all 
applicable statutes, including the tribunal's enabling statutes, global procedural and 
judicial review acts, and rules of court, for time limits affecting judicial review. However, 
courts are often statutorily empowered to extend the time limit for making a judicial 
review application—for example, where there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, 
where no substantial prejudice or hardship would result from such an extension, or where 
the party can demonstrate prima facie grounds for relief.149 
The final threshold matter that a party must establish before gaining access to judicial 
review is that they have exhausted all other adequate means of recourse for challenging 
the tribunal's actions.150 Depending on the tribunal's enabling statute, other means of 
recourse may include almost any of the legal remedies above: reconsideration by the 
same tribunal, appeals to internal appellate tribunals and other intra-agency mechanisms 
such as grievance arbitration, and appeals to a court. However, not all other means of 
recourse will necessarily be adequate. Considerations include “the convenience of the 
alternative remedy; the nature of the error alleged; the nature of the other forum which 
could deal with the issue, including its remedial capacity; the existence of adequate and 
effective recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place; 
expeditiousness; the relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; economical use 
of judicial resources; and cost.”151 In balancing these factors, a court should engage in a 
broad inquiry that considers not only whether some other remedy is adequate but 
whether—taking into account the purposes and policy considerations underpinning the 
legislative scheme, the balance of convenience to the parties, and other factors the court 
                                               
146 Rule 3.15 of the Alberta Rules of Court (Alta Reg 124/2010) imposes this time limit 
where the relief sought is the setting aside of a decision or act. 
147 Rule 7.05(1), Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, 2008, imposes the time limit on 
applications for relief in the nature of certiorari, online: 
[lt]http://www.courts.ns.ca/rules/cpr_consolidated_11_03_11/cpr_consolidated_rules_11
_03_11.pdf%5Bgt]. 
148 BC ATA, supra note 15, s 57(1). Note, however, that the ATA does not apply to all 
tribunals in BC 
149 E.g. Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act, supra note 125, s 5; BC ATA, supra note 
15, s 57(2). The Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, does not set out the conditions that 
must be met in order for the court to grant an extension of time: s 18.1(2). 
150 Harelkin v University of Regina, [1979] 2 SCR 561, 96 DLR (3d) 14. 
151 Strickland, supra note 11512 at para 42. 
 
may consider relevant—granting judicial review in the circumstances would be 
appropriate.152 
 Courts will not find existing non-court appeal mechanisms to be inadequate based 
only on unproven allegations that an appellate tribunal will suffer from the same errors153 
or biases154 as the original tribunal. Nor can challengers circumvent available appeals in 
favour of judicial review by consent, or simply by raising apparent issues with the 
original tribunal's procedure or jurisdiction.155 Also, at least in the context of Aboriginal 
self-government in the taxation field, the fact that appellate tribunal members lack indicia 
of institutional independence—that is, they may not be paid, they lack security of tenure, 
and they are appointed by the people whose claims they have to adjudicate—will not 
make that appellate body "inadequate" without concrete evidence that independence is 
lacking in practice.156 
Parliament and several provinces have also legislated in this area. For example, 
the Federal Courts Act prohibits judicial review by the Federal Court where an available 
appeal of a tribunal's decision to the Federal Court exists.157 Quebec's Code of Civil 
Procedure also prohibits a superior court from applying Quebec's version of certiorari to 
a tribunal decision where an appeal is available, unless the tribunal lacked or exceeded its 
statutory authority. On the other hand, Ontario's Judicial Review Procedure Act and 
Prince Edward Island's Judicial Review Act both permit judicial review notwithstanding 
                                               
152 Ibid at paras 43-44. 
153 Harelkin, supra note 149. 
154 Turnbull v Canadian Institute of Actuaries (1995), 129 DLR (4th) 42 (Man CA); but 
see, contra, Re Batorski v Moody (1983), 42 OR (2d) 647 (Div Ct). 
155 Canada (Border Services Agency) v CB Powell Limited, supra note 119, at para 33 
("Concerns about procedural fairness or bias, the presence of an important legal or 
constitutional issue, or the fact that all parties have consented to early recourse to the 
courts are not exceptional circumstances allowing parties to bypass an administrative 
process, as long as that process allows the issues to be raised and an effective remedy to 
be granted … [T]he presence of so-called jurisdictional issues is not an exceptional 
circumstance justifying early recourse to courts.").  
156 Matsqui, supra note 152. 
157 Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18.5. For a more extensive discussion of access 
to judicial review in the Federal Court, see Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan 
Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250, [2014] 367 DLR (4th) 525. 
 
any other right of appeal to the courts.158 Of course, the fact that a court may grant 
judicial review, even where a right of appeal exists, does not mean that it will do so. As 
we might expect, courts are reluctant to do so.159 
E. Remedies on Judicial Review 
The remedies available on judicial review have their roots in the ancient prerogative 
writs, discussed further below. Over time, those became unwieldy. In many provinces 
they were modified by statute to redress problems arising from the writs' extreme 
technicality and unjustified narrowness. However, it is still necessary to understand the 
ancient writs to understand the scope and range of remedies available on judicial review. 
For example, neither the old writs nor the reform statutes, which are based on the old 
writs, permit a court on judicial review to substitute its views on the substance of a matter 
for the tribunal's views. The old writs also continue to operate in some provinces, albeit 
in a more limited way.160 
A party contemplating judicial review should also be aware that, unlike an appeal, an 
application for judicial review usually does not automatically stay the enforcement of the 
underlying tribunal order, although the tribunal or the court or both may have the power 
to stay the tribunal's order on application.161 The legislative decision to make stays 
                                               
158 See, respectively, Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ, c C-25, art 846; Ontario Judicial 
Review Procedure Act, supra note 143, s 2(1); and Judicial Review Act (PEI JRA), 
RSPEI 1988, c J-3, s 4(2). 
159 See, e.g. Volochay, supra note 12018 at para 70, Anne & Gilbert Inc v Government of 
PEI, 2012 PECA 4, 320 Nfld & PEIR 99. 
160 For example, the "direct action in nullity" is a judicial review remedy that predates the 
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ 1977, c C-25, and is not referred to in it, yet it 
continues to operate: Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v Lafontaine (Village), supra note 122. 
In New Brunswick, one cannot apply specifically for the traditional prerogative writs of 
certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, which are now available simply as judicial review. 
However, a range of "alternative" remedies echoing the old prerogative writs continues to 
exist. See e.g. Sullivan v Greater Moncton Planning District Commission (1993), 132 
NBR (2d) 285 (TD). Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench Rules, Man Reg 553/88, Rule 
68.01 states only that "[a] Judge on application may grant an order of mandamus, 
prohibition, certiorari or quo warranto." Yukon Territory has not enacted any statutory 
changes to the common law writs. 
161 See e.g. Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act, supra note 54, s 25 (an appeal acts 
as a stay, but judicial review is not an appeal for that purpose); New Brunswick Energy 
and Utilities Board Act, SNB 2006, c E-9.18, s 52(2) (judicial review does not 
automatically stay an order, but the board itself or the Court of Appeal may stay it). 
Indeed, one federal statute that establishes securities clearing houses and banking and 
 
automatic for many appeals but not for judicial review applications is consistent with the 
"last resort" nature of judicial review. The rules regarding stays vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and from tribunal to tribunal, so parties seeking a stay should be sure to 
review the relevant enabling statute, as well as the rules of court and any omnibus statutes 
governing procedure or judicial review. 
The following sections introduce the prerogative writs and subsequent statutory 
reform. Because judicial review remains a fundamentally discretionary power, the bases 
on which courts have refused to grant a remedy are also discussed. 
1. Introduction to the Prerogative Writs 
Certiorari is the most commonly used prerogative remedy, both historically and 
today. Certiorari ("cause to be certified") is a special proceeding by which a superior 
court requires some inferior tribunal, board, or judicial officer to provide it with the 
record of its proceedings for review for excess of jurisdiction. It was the established 
method by which the Court of King's Bench in England, from earliest times, checked the 
jurisdiction of inferior courts and maintained the supremacy of the royal courts. In the 
United States, the vast majority of applications to the US Supreme Court are still made by 
way of a petition for certiorari. A successful certiorari application results in the 
"quashing" (effectively, the invalidating) of a tribunal's order or decision. It is an ex post 
facto remedy. Note, however, that generally the court cannot substitute its decision for 
the decision of a tribunal that the court finds had erred, because the court has not been 
granted the statutory decision-making authority.162 Quashing the existing decision 
effectively means that the matter is remitted to the administrative decision-maker, who 
still retains the statutory jurisdiction to decide. This is what happened in Gitxaala Nation. 
The related writ of prohibition is another special proceeding, issued by an 
appellate court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction, or to prevent a 
non-judicial officer or entity from exercising a power. Prohibition is a kind of common 
law injunction to prevent an unlawful assumption of jurisdiction. Unlike certiorari, 
which provides relief after a decision is made, prohibition is used to obtain relief pre-
emptively. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or person exercising judicial 
functions in a manner or by means not within its jurisdiction or discretion. 
                                               
payment systems stipulates that no stay shall be granted for a judicial review application 
related to the government's administration of those systems. Canadian Payments Act, 
RSC 1985, c C-21, s 46. 
162 In exceptional circumstances, a court will nevertheless make the decision that it finds 
the original tribunal ought to have made. See e.g. Renaud v Québec (Commission des 
affaires sociales), [1999] 3 SCR 855, 184 DLR (4th) 441, [1999] SCJ No 70 (QL); Corp 
of the Canadian Civil Liberties Assn v Ontario (Civilian Commission on Police Services) 
(2002), 61 OR (3d) 649 (CA); Allman v Amacon Property Management Services Inc, 
[2007] BCJ No 1144 (QL) (CA). 
 
Mandamus (literally, "we command") is a writ issued by a superior court to 
compel a lower court or a government agency to perform a duty it is mandated to 
perform. It can be combined with an application for certiorari. Certiorari would be used 
to quash a decision—for example, for a lack of procedural fairness—while mandamus 
would be used to force the tribunal to reconsider the matter in a procedurally fair manner. 
A variation on mandamus gives the court the ability to send a matter back to a tribunal 
for reconsideration with directions. Superior courts have the inherent power to order 
reconsideration with directions, and several provincial statutes and rules of court, as well 
as the Federal Courts Act,163 also grant this power. If the court issues directions, it must 
clearly state what the original panel is to do or what it must refrain from doing. These 
directions may only protect against unfair procedures or excess of power and cannot tell 
the tribunal how it must decide. In particular, the general rule is that mandamus cannot be 
used to force an administrative decision-maker to exercise its discretion in a particular 
way, although exercises of discretion cannot be unlawful and must always conform to the 
constitution.164 
A declaration is a judgment of a court that determines and states the legal position 
of the parties, or the law that applies to them. There are two kinds of declarations: the 
public law kind, used to declare some government action ultra vires, and the private law 
kind, used to clarify the law or declare a private party's rights under a statute. The public 
law kind is the main concern of administrative law. Declarations are not enforceable, and 
they cannot require anyone to take or refrain from taking any action. Historically, this 
made declarations useful in actions against the Crown itself because the traditional 
common law position was that relief in the nature of mandamus was not available against 
                                               
163 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7. 
164 In the special circumstances of the so-called Insite case, which concerned a safe drug 
injection site in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside neighbourhood, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the province’s Minister of Health had not exercised its discretion 
consistent with the Charter when he refused to exempt Insite from certain criminal law 
provisions. The Court found that sending the matter back to the Minister for 
reconsideration would be inadequate in view of the attendant risks and delays, and that 
“the only constitutional response to [Insite’s exemption application] was to grant it.” It 
therefore took the rare step of issuing an order in the nature of mandamus, compelling the 
Minister to exercise its discretion so as to issue an exemption to Insite. Canada (Attorney 
General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134, para 150. 
The Federal Court of Appeal has done the same in some recent cases in which it held that 
there was “only one lawful way” in which the decision maker’s discretion could be 
exercised: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v LeBon, 2013 FCA 55; 
or, pushing the concept further, in “exceptional” cases in which, for example, “there has 
been substantial delay and the additional delay caused by remitting the matter to the 
administrative decision-maker for re-decision threatens to bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute”: D’Errico v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 95 at paras 16-
18. 
 
the Crown. It was not thought appropriate for a court to order enforcement against the 
Crown, because the Crown was the source of its own authority. (These prohibitions on 
remedies against the Crown itself were substantially, though not completely, relaxed over 
the course of the 20th century.) The non-coercive nature of the remedy has not often 
proven to be a problem, because court declarations against government bodies in 
particular tend to be respected.165 Where a declaration does not produce a government 
response, however, as happened in the Khadr case,166 the declaration may look like a 
distinctly second-rate remedy relative to mandamus. At least where the Crown 
prerogative over foreign affairs is concerned, an aggrieved party may find himself or 
herself having a right without a remedy—or, more accurately, having a right for which a 
meaningful remedy exists only in the political, and not the legal, arena. 
Less common these days are the writs of habeas corpus and quo warranto. 
Habeas corpus (literally, "produce the body") is a writ employed to bring a person before 
a court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not 
illegal. Like certiorari, habeas corpus continues to live an active life in the United States, 
where it is the primary mechanism for challenging state-level death penalty sentences in 
the federal courts. In Canada, habeas corpus applications are fairly rare. Most are brought 
by prisoners detained in correctional institutions and by police, immigration, child 
welfare, and mental health detainees. Unlike the other prerogative writs, habeas corpus is 
not inherently discretionary. It issues “as of right if the applicant proves a deprivation of 
liberty and raises a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of the 
deprivation.”167 Quo warranto ("by what warrant?" or "by what authority?") is a writ 
                                               
165 Lount Corp v Canada (Attorney General), [1984] 1 FC 332 at 365 (TD) (noting that 
"by long tradition, the executive abides by declarations of the Court even though not 
formally or specifically directed to do so"); aff'd sub nom Canada (Attorney General) v 
Lount Corp, [1985] 2 FCR 185. 
166 Khadr, supra note 87. In 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada determined that Omar 
Khadr had been deprived of his s 7 Charter rights by Canadian officials operating at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility, who shared transcripts of their interviews of Mr. 
Khadr with US authorities. The Court ordered that the Canadian authorities produce those 
transcripts to Mr. Khadr, which they did, but the Prime Minister refused requests to seek 
his repatriation from the United States to Canada. In its 2010 decision, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that, notwithstanding the violation of Mr. Khadr's s 7 Charter rights, it 
would not order the Canadian government to request his repatriation. In light of the 
Crown prerogative over foreign affairs, the court concluded that the appropriate remedy 
was a declaration that Canada had infringed Mr. Khadr's s 7 rights, leaving it to the 
government to decide how best to respond. The government did not seek Mr. Khadr's 
repatriation. 
167 Khela, supra note 121 at para 41. In other ways, as well, habeas corpus has developed 
to be a speedier and more accessible remedy for those who claim to have been unlawfully 
 
used to inquire into what authority existed to justify acts by or powers claimed by a 
public office. It is rarely used today, and some provinces have abolished it by statute.168  
2.  Statutory Reform 
Over time, each of the prerogative writs above came to be characterized by 
technical complexity and arcane rules. Potentially meritorious applications were 
dismissed because the applicant had petitioned for the wrong writ, or because the claim 
was barred by some technical limitation. For example, although court decisions later re-
expanded the writ's scope, a number of cases in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s held that 
certiorari and prohibition were only available to address "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" (as 
opposed to “administrative”) final decisions that affected the rights of citizens. As the 
case law became more arcane and the practical injustices more obvious, policy reasons 
for maintaining the distinction between the various writs eroded. 
The result, in many provinces and at the Federal Court,169 was statutory reform. 
Some provinces enacted omnibus statutes governing judicial review or statutory/civil 
                                               
deprived of their liberty. Ibid at paras 38-50. On the Federal Court’s jurisdiction, see also 
infra note 169. 
168 E.g. PEI JRA, supra note 162, s 11; BC Judicial Review Procedure Act (BCJRPA), 
RSBC 1996, c 241, s 18. These statutes provide that certain remedies for what would 
have been an information in the nature of quo warranto are still available. However, quo 
warranto is still used in Quebec and New Brunswick to challenge the authority of 
municipal councillors on the basis of a prohibited conflict of interest. See e.g. R v 
Wheeler, [1979] 2 SCR 650. 
169 Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18(1) provides that the Federal Court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction "to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of 
prohibition, writ of mandamus, or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, 
against any federal board, commission or other tribunal." Note that habeas corpus is not 
included in the list. Jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus in, e.g. federal penitentiaries, 
which are otherwise subject to Federal Court review, remains with the provincial superior 
courts: Khela, supra note 1321 at paras 31-35. 
 
procedure,170 while others used their rules of court to enact changes.171 Only Yukon 
Territory seems to have left the common law untouched. The details vary from one 
statutory scheme to another, but key statutes that may apply are the Federal Courts Act, 
the Ontario and BC Judicial Review Procedure Acts (JRPAs), the Ontario Statutory 
Powers Procedure Act, the BC Administrative Tribunals Act, the PEI Judicial Review 
Act, Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure, and the rules of court in other provinces and 
territories. These important statutes have sought to clarify procedure surrounding judicial 
review. Some have also sought to change the substantive shape of judicial review itself. 
Therefore, parties considering challenging a tribunal order must be aware of the relevant 
statutes' provisions, in addition to the provisions of the tribunal's own enabling statutes. 
Statutory reforms commonly provide for the following: 
 1. Simplified application procedures. For example, a statute may state that 
applications for orders "in the nature of" mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari shall be 
deemed to be applications for judicial review, to be brought by way of an originating 
notice or petition. The new judicial review application combines, and in the process 
supersedes, the old writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, public law declaration, 
and injunction. (Some statutes include quo warranto and habeas corpus within the ambit 
of the statute; some abolish quo warranto; some provinces have a dedicated Habeas 
Corpus Act.) It is sufficient for a party to set out the grounds on which relief is sought 
and the nature of the relief sought, without having to specify under which particular writ 
they might have proceeded at common law. 
2. Simplified remedies including, for example, the power to set aside a 
decision or direct the tribunal to reconsider its decision, with or without directions. Some 
statutes also expressly give courts the authority to ignore technical irregularities or 
defects in form if the court finds no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has 
occurred. 
3. Greater clarity as to who may be parties to a hearing—for example, 
decision-makers whose exercise of statutory authority is being questioned. Generally, 
                                               
170 Ontario JRPA, supra note 125, BCJRPA, supra note 149, PEI JRA, supra note 162, 
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ, c C-25. Ontario and British Columbia have 
enacted the most comprehensive reforms. Be aware that, apart from habeas corpus, 
terminology in Quebec is different. For example, prohibition and certiorari are codified 
under "evocation" and "revision" in s 846 of the Civil Code. Remedies equivalent to quo 
warranto and mandamus are codified under ss 838 and 844ff, respectively, and the terms 
"quo warranto" and "mandamus" are used in practice, but they do not appear in the Code. 
There also exists the "declaratory judgment in motion," codified at s 453, which allows a 
party to have their rights "declared." 
171 Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, Nova 
Scotia, Nunavut, and Saskatchewan. 
 
judicial review statutes also provide that notice must be given to the Attorney General, 
who is entitled as of right to be heard on the application. 
4. A right of appeal. Judicial review applications are generally made to 
provincial superior courts, and the statutes provide for a subsequent right of appeal to the 
provincial Court of Appeal. 
5. Judicial review mechanisms to challenge interlocutory orders and to 
resolve interim issues. At common law, certiorari was only available with respect to 
"decisions"—that is, final orders. However, the BC and Ontario JRPAs use the words 
"exercise of statutory power," rather than the word "decision," thereby expanding the 
range of judicial review to include any exercise of statutory power.172 Other statutes 
permit a tribunal itself to refer a "stated case" to the courts for determination of a question 
of law, after which the case can go back to the original tribunal for determination of the 
ultimate issues.173 For example, BC tribunals that do not have jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions under the ATA can issue a stay and refer a constitutional 
question to a court of competent jurisdiction.174 Enabling statutes must authorize stated 
cases. 
F. Private Law Remedies 
As noted above, a tribunal’s enabling statute may give it the power to order a range of 
remedies, including money damages. Courts on judicial review do not have the same 
ability. The difficulty is that neither the old prerogative writs, nor the new statutory 
remedy of judicial review, allow a party to obtain monetary relief through judicial 
review. In some circumstances, unhappy parties would probably prefer monetary relief to 
any other remedy. Attempts to obtain private law remedies from public bodies has put 
considerable momentum behind the development of the law in this area, and courts have 
responded in two main ways. 
The first has been to clarify and elaborate upon those instances where public bodies, 
like administrative agencies, can be subject to purely private law remedies outside the 
scope of administrative action and judicial review. The Crown and its servants can be 
liable to private parties for monetary relief,175 although some statutes limit individual 
                                               
172 BCJRPA, supra note 171, s 3; Ontario JRPA, supra note 143, s 2. 
173 E.g. Federal Courts Act, supra note 109, s 18.3; BC ATA, supra note 15, s 43. 
174 BC ATA, ibid, ss 44, 45. 
175 The Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction over all actions for damages 
against the federal Crown. See supra note 143. Individual servants of the Crown, 
including ministers, are also liable for breaches of private law duties on the same basis as 
other individuals. However, “core policy matters” are protected from suit: R v Imperial 
 
administrative tribunal members' liability.176 However, to seek monetary relief, an 
aggrieved party must initiate a separate civil action for restitution or damages alongside, 
or in lieu of, a judicial review application.  
Government agencies can be sued, for example, for breach of contract, for the tort of 
negligence, or the special tort of misfeasance in (or abuse of) public office. The first two 
are straightforward private law actions. The third, as a potential source of money 
damages against public actors acting in their public capacity, has attracted some interest 
lately. The threshold is high, however. To succeed in an action for tort of misfeasance in 
public office, the plaintiff must establish, in addition to the basic elements of negligence, 
(1) deliberate and unlawful conduct by someone in public office, and (2) the public 
officer's subjective knowledge that the conduct was unlawful and likely to harm the 
plaintiff. Because this tort alleges bad faith on the part of a public official, "clear proof 
commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong" is required.177 Because a public officer 
must be able to make decisions that are adverse to some peoples’ interests, in the service 
of broader public policy goals, mere knowledge of that harm is insufficient. The public 
officer must “deliberately engage in conduct that he or she knows to be inconsistent with 
the obligations of the office.”178 
The leading case on the tort of misfeasance in public office, Odhavji, involved an 
action for damages against police officers and the chief of the Metropolitan Toronto 
Police by the estate of an individual shot by the police. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
police officers involved in the shooting did not promptly or fully comply with their 
statutory duty to cooperate with an ensuing investigation, and that the chief of police did 
not adequately compel them to cooperate. The case made its way to the Supreme Court of 
Canada on the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim, where the court 
determined that the plaintiff had made out a cause of action and that the matter should be 
allowed to proceed. In other words, the court held that there was such a thing as the tort 
of misfeasance in public office. Subsequent cases have considered allegations of tort of 
misfeasance in public office against a range of public actors including provincial and 
                                               
Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 SCR 45 at para 90. A more in-depth 
discussion is contained in Chapter 11, Crown Liability and Administrative Law.  
176 E.g. BC ATA, supra note 15, s 56. 
177 Powder Mountain Resorts Ltd v British Columbia, 2001 BCCA 619 at para 8.  
178 Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263 at para 28. On the 
tort's value as a practical tool for enhancing state accountability in the UK context, 
notwithstanding its rather poor fit with the conceptual underpinnings of modern tort law, 
see John Murphy, "Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Tort Law Misfit?" (2012) 32 
Oxford J Leg Stud 51. 
 
federal departments or ministries, federal penitentiary staff, hospital boards, and racing 
commissions.179 
As these cases make clear, some torts overlap with a potential judicial review 
application while others do not. Judicial review was not a possibility in a case like 
Odhavji, because there was no administrative decision to challenge. It was about police 
action. In other cases, like one involving Health Canada’s handling of a drug approval 
application, or a hospital board’s revocation of a doctor’s privileges, an administrative 
actor’s conduct may be precisely what is being challenged.  
The relationship and potential overlap between private rights of action and judicial 
review applications was a cause for concern for a number of years. Then, in 2010, in a 
case concerning private law claims for breach of contract, negligence, and unjust 
enrichment, the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that parties do not need to seek 
judicial review before they can bring a private law action for damages, and the private 
law action does not constitute a collateral attack on government conduct.180 Alexander 
Pless discusses this and other cases in greater detail in Chapter 10, Crown Liability for 
Negligent Administrative Action.Following TeleZone, if a party has a fundamentally 
private law claim arising from an administrative decision, and primarily wants monetary 
                                               
179 Some have succeeded, including Apotex Inc v Canada, 2017 FCA 73 (Health Canada 
deliberately evaluated drug approval application against inappropriate standard, and 
attempted to conceal or dissemble that fact); Rosenhek v Windsor Regional Hospital, 
2010 ONCA 13, [2010] OJ No 129 (QL), leave to appeal refused, [2010] SCCA No 89 
(hospital revoked doctor’s privileges for ulterior purpose, not for the public good, and in 
bad faith); Ontario Racing Commission v O'Dwyer, 2008 ONCA 446, 293 DLR (4th) 559 
(Racing Commission frustrated raceway employee’s efforts to pursue a complaint about 
Commission employee’s prior conduct, which had led to employee’s firing); JP v British 
Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2015 BCSC 1216 (Ministry employee 
approached child protection file with a closed mind, wilfully and deliberately behaving 
unlawfully and not in best interests of the children); McMaster v The Queen, 2009 FC 
937, [2009] FCJ No 1071 (QL) (long and apparently intentional delay by Corrections and 
prison staff in getting a prisoner new shoes, resulting in prisoner’s injury while 
exercising). See also Carhoun & Sons Enterprises Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 
2015 BCCA 163 (motion to strike dismissed, where respondent alleged unreasonable 
delay by government in carrying out an environmental assessment). Others have failed: 
see, e.g. Harrison v British Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2010 BCCA 
220, 319 DLR (4th) 251, leave to appeal refused, [2010] SCCA No 293 (no evidence of 
targeted malice by social worker who disclosed unsubstantiated complaint of child abuse 
to employer of alleged abuser, who worked in youth support services). 
180 TeleZone, supra note 142. The courts retain the residual discretion to stay a damages 
action if the claim being made is actually "in its essential character" an application for 
judicial review. TeleZone, ibid at para 78; on this point see also Manuge v Canada, 2010 
SCC 67, another of the five companion cases released alongside TeleZone. 
 
damages, that party may proceed directly by way of private action. As Binnie J points 
out, though, "no amount of artful pleading in a damages case will succeed in setting aside 
the order said to have harmed the claimant or enjoin its enforcement. … The claimant 
must … be content to take its money (if successful) and walk away leaving the order 
standing."181 Note that, while TeleZone makes clear that parties do not need to seek 
judicial review before they can bring an action for damages, that case still allows the 
Crown to raise the legality of the decision as a defence to the damages action.182  
A second and genuinely novel response to the question of when damages could be 
available against administrative authorities would be to develop a claim for monetary 
relief grounded entirely in public, as opposed to private, law. This is what a majority of 
the Federal Court of Appeal recently did, in obiter, in Paradis Honey.183  
The case involved a claim by a group of Canadian beekeepers that the respondents, 
the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 
were negligent in imposing a blanket prohibition on importing honey bee “packages” 
from the United States. (Bees can be imported in “packages,” which hold a queen and a 
small colony, or simply as a “queen,” a much smaller container holding a queen bee and a 
few attendant bees. Replacing a failed bee colony with a package, as opposed to a queen, 
is more efficient and less risky.) The appellant beekeepers argued that the Minister had 
adopted a blanket policy of issuing no permits for importing bee packages, even though 
the relevant statute and regulations gave the Minister the authority to issue permits to 
import animals (in this case, bees) in any kind of packaging so long as doing so would 
not introduce disease or toxic substances into Canada. The appellants argued that the 
prohibition exceeded the Minister’s lawful authority. They further argued that in 
prohibiting packages while still permitting queens to be imported, the respondents were 
using their permit-granting authority in bad faith or for an improper purpose, and 
impermissibly favouring some parts of the Canadian beekeeping community over others. 
                                               
181 TeleZone, supra note 142 at para 75. 
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action for damages is a little more complicated in practice than this, and is explored in 
more detail in Chapter 11. 
183 Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada, 2015 FCA 89, 382 DLR (4th) 720. The majority’s 
reasons (by Stratas JA for himself and Nadon JA) were based on the beekeepers’ claims 
in negligence and bad faith against the respondents: see paras 88-111 (among other 
things, forcefully criticizing the ban on private suits against government “policy” 
decisions, following Imperial Tobacco, supra note 175 at paras 102-110). The majority 
then went on to observe that “were it necessary,” they would also have concluded that the 
facts pleaded supported a claim for monetary relief in public law. Pelletier JA, dissenting, 
would have confirmed the Federal Court’s dismissal of the beekeepers’ statement of 
claim. The matter was subsequently certified as a class action: Paradis Honey Ltd v 
Canada, 2017 FC 199. 
 
The decision occurred at the motion to dismiss stage, meaning that the majority of the 
Federal Court of Appeal held only that, assuming the facts as pleaded were all true, it was 
not plain and obvious that the appellant beekeepers’ claims would fail. 
The appellants sought money damages to compensate them for the costs they incurred 
as a result of the blanket prohibition on importing bee packages. Because they were 
seeking damages, they had to establish a claim in private law—in this case, primarily in 
negligence.184 As the majority pointed out in obiter, the tort of negligence is indeed a 
poor fit for a situation in which parties have been harmed by impermissible government 
action. It is grounded in proximity and the concept of what one owes to one’s 
neighbour—admittedly, a strange way to conceptualize the relationship between citizens 
and the state.185 To make a claim, therefore, the appellants had to plead that their rights 
were particularly well-defined, based on specific legislative criteria, and that the 
respondents had specifically assured them that imports that affected their economic 
interests would only be banned where there was scientific evidence of risk.186 
After dealing with the negligence claim, the majority of the court goes on to consider 
a matter not pleaded: the novel possibility of a public law claim for monetary damages, 
which the majority describes as a “responsible, incremental change to the common law 
founded upon legal doctrine and achieved through accepted pathways of legal reasoning 
… [which] does not throw into doubt the outcomes of previous cases, but rather offers 
better explanations for them, leading us to a more understandable, more coherent law of 
liability for public authorities.”187 Rather than trying to adapt ill-fitting private law 
principles to public law contexts (or, in their words, “using a screwdriver to turn a 
bolt”188), the majority argues for drawing on underlying principles of administrative law 
and judicial review to create a new test: that as a matter of public law, courts should grant 
relief, including monetary relief, when (1) “a public law authority acts unacceptably or 
indefensibly in the administrative law sense,” and when (2) “as a matter of discretion, a 
remedy should be granted.”189 The majority insists that, the limits of the prerogative writs 
                                               
184 Both majority and minority agreed that the appellants’ allegations, if proved, would 
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185 Ibid at paras 119-130. 
186 Ibid at paras 90-91.  
187 Ibid at para 118; see also para 145. 
188 Ibid at para 127. 
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and judicial review aside, underlying public law principles support courts’ discretion to 
grant monetary relief. Moreover, there are times when the goal of adequately 
compensating the harmed, or perhaps the quality of a public authority’s conduct (if it is, 
for example, exceptionally poor or clearly in violation of a duty), justifies a court 
exercising its discretion to grant a new species of public law monetary damages. 
The obiter in Paradis Honey has begun to provoke discussion, as was surely its 
intention, not only about the imperfections of existing private law jurisprudence vis-à-vis 
public actors, but also about the public law foundations on which administrative law 
rests, and about the limits of the prerogative writs and judicial review.190 It is too soon to 
say whether Justice Stratas’s argument in favour of a public law monetary damages 
remedy will gain traction. What we can say at this stage is that the proposed change 
would not be incremental, at least at the level of theory. At the level of application, 
though, it may be: recognizing a public law remedy in money damages may actually 
provide us with a more coherent and explicit explanation for outcomes that courts already 
sometimes reach. Given the ongoing desire by parties for a remedy in money damages 
and given the narrowness of the tort of misfeasance in public office, we can expect more 
action around this issue. 
V. Conclusion 
A goal of this chapter has been to locate judicial review within the larger 
administrative law landscape. By understanding the concerns that animate administrative 
law generally, we can begin to understand the outlines of this parallel universe of actions 
and remedies. Administrative law remedies are the product of history, and of democratic 
and rule-of-law priorities, often acting in tension with each other. They need to be 
considered in light of the tug of war between courts and legislators as demonstrated by, 
                                               
textbook. Basically, it usually requires that the administrative actor act outside the range 
of reasonableness. The content of the second requirement—the fact that judicial review 
and its remedies are discretionary—has been discussed above.  
190 See e.g. Patrong v Banks, 2015 ONSC 3078 at paras 69-78 (partially endorsing the 
majority’s argument and arguing for a broader understanding of the state’s private law 
liability); but see Carhoun, supra note 179 (citing Paradis Honey before proceeding with 
a conventional tort law analysis); Paul Daly, “Rethinking Public Authority Liability in 
Tort: Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada, 2015 FCA 89” (13 April 2015) at Administrative 
Law Matters, online: 
[lt]http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/04/13/rethinking-public-
authority-liability-in-tort-paradis-honey-ltd-v-canada-2015-fca-89/[gt]. Justice Stratas’s 
reasons in the case have also attracted interest for his discussion at paras 134-137, of how 
the “margin of appreciation” that courts grant administrative decision makers on judicial 
review may be narrower or wider, depending on the nature of the decision-maker. Thus 
far, the Supreme Court has taken a dim view of this suggestion, preferring an approach 
that seems more focused on the nature of the question at issue: Wilson, supra note 1032 
at paras 18-39. For more on this, see Chapters 11 (A History of Substantive Fairness and 
How We Got to Here) and 12 (Making Sense of Reasonableness). 
for example, legislators' creation of internal appeal mechanisms and courts' periodic 
circumvention of those internal appeals in favour of immediate judicial review. Another 
recurring theme is the tug of war between tribunals and the courts that oversee them, in 
terms of courts' willingness to recognize and give effect to potentially creative and 
uncourtlike tribunal remedies. These tensions are emblematic of a deeper contest between 
deeply held values around the rule of law on the one hand, and administrative expertise, 
efficiency, and democratic accountability on the other.  
Administrative law remedies are also path-dependent, meaning that they have been 
shaped by their historical origins in the prerogative writs and by subsequent, sometimes 
piecemeal, attempts to modify judicial review. If we were to design a set of remedies out 
of whole cloth today, it is not obvious that we would decide to set up two separate 
mechanisms for accessing the courts (that is, statutory appeals and judicial review). We 
might create an overarching administrative review tribunal like Quebec's instead. 
Perhaps, as well, there was an earlier juncture at which we could have developed a public 
law remedy for monetary damages, and perhaps it would have spared us a bit of 
confusing caselaw along the way. Freed of the historical baggage of the prerogative writs, 
a court might have even imposed monetary damages on the Crown for its failure to 
consult and accommodate in the Gitxaala Nation case. Yet without genuinely sweeping 
reform, administrative law remedies will continue to be influenced by their historical 
roots, and the scope of those remedies in turn will continue to influence the development 
of administrative law as a whole. Even as these remedies continue to evolve, they will be 
informed by the particular history and rules that govern this parallel legal universe. 
In part as a corrective to the heavy conventional emphasis on judicial review and its 
idiosyncrasies, this chapter tries to situate judicial review remedies within a larger 
context. Myriad other remedies are available at different stages of administrative action. 
Rich debate exists concerning appropriate tribunal functioning and the proper scope of 
tribunal action. Tribunals develop remedies that are novel, by court standards, because 
they are differently constituted than courts are. It is in part the heterogeneity and depth of 
this experience that underlies the modern instinct that courts should show some respectful 
deference in exercising judicial review of tribunal decisions. Regardless of how we may 
feel about any particular decision, this chapter also counsels respect for that difference. A 
conversation about administrative law remedies illustrates the larger point that animates 
much of this volume: judicial review and court-centred processes, which make up the 
bulk of this book, are nevertheless just one, final stage of administrative law and practice. 
It should not limit our appreciation of, and approach to, the complex and varied forms 
that front-line administrative action can represent. 
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